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Summary
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by studying the link between
educational choices, skill mismatch and wages in a labour market with search
frictions with on-the-job search.
In the first paper, I used empirical techniques to look at the link between skill
mismatch and wages. I found that over-education and mismatch is part of a
career mobility or job-to-job transition in the labour market. Workers accept
jobs for which they are overqualified and search on-the-job to move to jobs that
are more matched to their educational level. In the process they accept a wage
cut which is temporary until they are able to find a job better suited to their
level of education.
In the second paper, I used search and matching framework to study the link
between on-the-job search and wages in an economy where high and low ability
workers compete for jobs. On-the-job search is a way in which workers reduce
the extent of mismatch and firms react to this. However, this interaction implies
that when more workers try to relocate the friction in the market reduces the
eﬃciency of resource allocation (by increasing mismatch) and it also creates more
wage inequality between the diﬀerent types of workers.
Finally in the third paper, I looked at the link between educational choices, and
skill mismatch in a labour market with search frictions. I found that fewer search
frictions lead to higher inequality in wages. If the cost of education is low enough,
more individuals choose to acquire education and get trained. As a consequence
mismatch increases.
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Part I
Over-Education, Mismatch & Wage
Penalty
1 Abstract
This paper adds to existing literature on mismatch, over-education, and wage
penalty by utilising Panel Data to investigate the permanence of over-education
wage penalties, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed eﬀects
estimates show that unobserved heterogeneity cannot account for all the diﬀer-
ence in wage penalty. However, for both non-graduates and graduates the wage
penalty for over-education is temporary. In this sense over-education is part of
a career mobility or job-to-job transition in the labour market. Workers accept
jobs for which they are overqualified and search on-the-job to move to jobs that
are more matched to their educational level.
10
2 Introduction
Over the past decades in all Western countries there has been an increase in
the educational level of the population. In the OECD countries about 38% of
population aged 55-64 years had at least an upper secondary education in 1992.
About 65% of the population aged 25-34 years had at least an upper secondary
education. This translates into a 70% increase in the share of population with at
least an upper secondary education in less than 30 years (Groot and Maassen van
den Brink, 1996). With a rapid increase in the education level of workers there
has been a higher than average increase in jobs requiring highly educated workers.
For many jobs skill upgrade has been necessary to perform eﬀectively. Despite
this, the increase in the demand for higher-educated labour has not kept pace
with the increase in the supply of skilled workers (Manacorda and Petrongola,
1998). Mismatch arises if the growth in the supply of higher-educated workers
is more than the growth in demand. This particular mismatch between the
workers and jobs is over-education. Workers are overeducated if their skills as
approximated by their level of education is higher than the skills required to do
the job they hold. Thus, the allocation of skills over jobs is not optimal.
Mismatch can be of two types, vertical mismatch and horizontal mismatch. Ver-
tical mismatch occurs when an individual accepts a job for which he/she is either
over-qualified or under-qualified. Horizontal mismatch on the other hand occurs
if a person specialising in one area of study accepts a job in another sector. In
this example if an economist whose highest level of education is a PhD takes up
a job as a historian then he/she will be considered mismatched. The job of a
historian may require a PhD as well but it would be a PhD in a relevant sector.
Many studies have shown that a large proportion of employees are mismatched
or overqualified for the jobs they do (Borghans and de Grip, 2000; Hartog, 2000).
This is achieved by deconstructing the eﬀect of education within a wage equation
into a part that the job requires (usually approximated through the respondent’s
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self-assessment of years of education required to do the job eﬀectively) and if the
respondent has a higher or lower level of education than that required (Brynin,
Lichtwardt and Longhi, 2006).
Over-education can be seen as a compensation for lacking other human capital en-
dowments, such as ability, on-the-job training or experience (Brynin, Lichtwardt
and Longhi, 2006). According to Groot (1993, 1996) and Sicherman (1991) over-
educated workers tend to have less experience and on-the-job training compared
to well-matched workers. Individuals having gone through a career break — for
instance women with children — have a higher likelihood of being in jobs for
which they are over-educated (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 1996). On
the other hand, over-education can be a part of a career mobility or job-to-job
transition in the labour market. Workers may accept jobs for which they are
overqualified and search on-the-job to move to jobs that are more matched to
their educational level. After controlling for experience, younger workers have
a higher probability of being over-educated than older workers (Groot, 1996;
Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 1996). Also, over-educated workers change
jobs more frequently, Sicherman (1991). This further implies that over-education
is merely a stage of acclimatization in the early years of a career.
People who are over-educated for a particular job tend to be paid better than
someone with the same job, but worse than someone with the same education,
but in a job which is considered adequate for their level of education (Duncan
and Hoﬀman, 1981; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988; Sicherman, 1991; Hersch,
1991; Cohn and Khan, 1995; Van Smoorenburg and Van der Velden, 2000).
Furthermore, people who are undereducated tend to earn more than someone of
the same education in a job that is adequate for them, but less than someone who
is in the same job that is adequate for them. This further suggests that being in
a job in which the employee is classified as over-educated could be viewed as a
“transient state”, where workers are attempting to gain additional information on
labour market opportunities and adjust their present position through additional
12
job search (Hartog, 2000). Most of the evidence in literature on over-education
uses cross-sectional data. Following Lindley and McIntosh (2010) this paper uses
panel data from the UK to examine three important aspects of over-education:
1. To what extent is the wage penalty to over-education attributable to unob-
served characteristics of the individuals?
2. Is the wage penalty for over-education fixed for all individuals or does it change
by whether the individuals escape over-education to move into matched jobs?
3. Is the wage penalty permanent for individuals who were able to escape over-
education and move into matched jobs compared to those who were always in a
matched job?
The main thought behind these questions is to analyse if there are diﬀerences in
unobserved characteristics between workers that are mismatched and those that
are not, and those who escape mismatch and those who do not. Given the increase
in participation of individuals in higher education over the recent decades, the
impact of mismatch on wages is an important issue. The next section of the paper
examines the methodology used in the estimation of the wage equations followed
by a section on the data set to be used. The next sections contain analysis of the
three questions mentioned above followed by an analysis of horizontal mismatch.
This is followed by some concluding remarks.
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3 Methodology
In the analysis, education level or qualification is measured in terms of the highest
qualification achieved, on a scale of 1 (less than O’levels) to 6 (higher education)
as shown in table 1.
Education Level Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Less O’levels (1) 39,372 24.04 24.04
O’levels (2) 32,077 19.58 43.62
A’levels (3) 24,165 14.75 58.37
Vocational (4) 44,133 26.94 85.32
First Degree (5) 19,284 11.77 97.09
Higher Degree (6) 4,763 2.91 100.00
Total 163,794 100.00
Table1: Education Level
Worker i is defined as over-educated if his/her actual highest qualification ex-
ceeds the required qualification at time t. To measure over qualification, I follow
Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000), Bauer (2002) and Battu and Sloane (2004).
I measure required qualification as the modal highest qualification in each oc-
cupation. This method is a variation of the method proposed by Verdugo and
Verdugo (1989) where they measure the required education as the mean level of
education amongst workers in the individual’s occupation. An individual is over-
educated if their actual qualification is one standard deviation above the mean
or more. According to Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000), the modal method is
preferred because it is independent of the arbitrary use of the standard deviation
and also since this method is less aﬀected by outliers.
However, both methods use actual qualification to measure required qualification
rather than the job requirement. In case the general qualification level of popula-
tion rises, the average qualification of workers hired in all populations increases.
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The mean and the mode after the tipping point in the most frequent qualification
is reached also increase. However, this is not a serious problem over the period
considered because even if there is no change in the job requirements, an increase
in qualifications increases the required education so there is an under estimation
of over-education.
3.1 Earnings
To analyse the aﬀect of education on earnings, I use a variation of over-required
and under-required (ORU) specification used by Hartog (1997) and Lindley and
McIntosh (2010). The model includes dummy variables for each level of required
education (RQmit ) for m=2. . . 6 with m=1 being the base level. Over-education is
measured using 5 dummy variables (Dkit) indicating the distance between actual
and required education when this value is positive. This specification allows the
returns to required-education and over-education to increase non-linearly across
levels. Variables are also included for levels of under-education, SU1it, SU2it, SU3it.
Again, the three variables indicate the distance between actual and required
education. Note, the reason only three variables for under-education are included
is that none of the individuals in my sample have an under-education of level 4
or 5.
Yit = bXit + g2RQ
2
it + ...+ g6RQ
6
it + d1D
1
it + ...+ d5D
5
it
m1SU
1
it + m2SU
2
it + m3SU
3
it + eit (1)
Yit is the net pay per month, Xit contains the relevant socio-economic and job
characteristics for worker i at time t that explain earnings.
I estimate the parameters in equation (1) using fixed eﬀect estimator to allow for
the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity biasing the parameters through cor-
relation between education and the error term eit. An individual should earn the
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same (determined by ability) regardless of the job after controlling for heterogen-
eity if unobserved heterogeneity is the only reason individuals work for jobs for
which they are over-qualified. In such a case the returns to an incremental level
of over-education,dk   dk 1, should be the same as the returns to an incremental
level of required education, gm   gm 1.
The next step is to estimate whether the variation in estimated returns to over-
education, change according to whether or not an individual moves to a well-
matched job. This is done by interacting a variable that gives the amount of
over-education experienced by an individual i at a time t, OLit, with an indicator
of whether the individual is still over-educated in the next period, OEit+1. In
order to reduce the number of interaction terms, over-education is constrained
to be linear. This is equation 3. For comparison a similar equation but without
the interaction terms was also estimated. This is equation 2.
Yit = bXit + g1RQ
2
it + ...+ g6RQ
6
it + aOLit + m1SU
1
it + m2SU
2
it + m3SU
3
it + eit (2)
Yit = bXit + g1RQ
2
it + ...+ g6RQ
6
it + fOLit + p(OLit ⇤OEit+1)
+m1SU
1
it + m2SU
2
it + m3SU
3
it + eit (3)
The over-education variable, OEit+1, was interacted with over-education rather
than required education since the former contains returns to individual charac-
teristics and the later returns to job level characteristics. The interaction term
was included to estimate whether earnings vary by unobserved individual char-
acteristics, as proxied by future job matching, so interaction with over-education
is more suitable.
Finally, I investigate whether over-education penalty is related to job specific
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characteristics or individual characteristics of workers in over-educated jobs, by
estimating whether the wage penalty remains after individuals move to a well-
matched job, compared to individuals who were already well-matched.
To do this, wage equations are estimated on samples of workers in matched jobs at
t = 1996, 2001, 2006 respectively, with a dummy variable for whether individual
i was over-educated at t = 1991, OEit=1991. This is equation 4.
Yit = bXit+g1RQ
2
it+...+g6RQ
6
it+lOLit=1991+m1SU
1
it+m2SU
2
it+m3SU
3
it+eit (4)
Hence, l measures the earnings diﬀerential in 1996, 2001 and 2006, between
workers who were always in a well-matched job and workers who were over-
educated in 1991.
Finally, I will estimate equation 4 again including an interaction term between the
variable OEit and a variable indicating that an individual’s highest qualification
is a degree or above (HQ5it). This allows me to determine whether the eﬀect of a
history of over-education on future matched wages is the same for graduates and
non-graduates. This is equation 5.
Yit = bXit + g1RQ
2
it + ...+ g6RQ
6
it + jOEit=1991 + sv(HQ
5
it ⇤OEit=1991)
+m1SU
1
it + m2SU
2
it + m3SU
3
it + eit (5)
Here,sv measures the diﬀerence in the penalty to previous (1991) over-education
between graduates and non-graduates.
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4 Data and Descriptive Information
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a longitudinal survey of house-
holds in Great Britain. The first wave of data was collected in 1991 with the
survey then repeated each year. I use data from the first 18 waves (1991-2008).
Note to check for robustness I also carried out the analysis using the Skills and
Employment Survey Series Dataset and the results were broadly similar. How-
ever, those results are not included in the paper because they are less reliable
and the longitudinal version of the survey has missing years.
In the BHPS dataset, in the first wave a nationally representative sample of
10,000 individuals, in 5,000 households, were interviewed from 250 areas of Great
Britain. In subsequent years these same individuals were re-interviewed, as were
any new members of their household, plus members of the new households of any
individual who left their original household, as well as new households to replace
any households that left the survey. Information was collected at both individual
and household level, and includes individual questions on human capital and
qualifications, as well as socio-economic characteristics such as income, employ-
ment status and region of residence, and job characteristics such as promotion
prospects and firm tenure.
The BHPS data has been used to create a panel of 173,332 working age adults
(from ages 18-60 years), with 81,303 male and 92,029 female observations. Table 2
provides summary statistics of net monthly earnings as well as all the explanatory
variables used throughout the analysis.
The BHPS data set is used to calculate required qualification (RQj) using the
mode level of HQi (highest qualification) by the occupation category j (taken
from the variable “jbgold”) averaged across 1991-2008. The data show that
around 38.4% of the individuals are over-educated. To see if over-education
is temporary, table 3 looks at transitions out of over-education for each occupa-
tional category for a balanced panel between 1991 and 2008. The table shows
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that of the 38.4% over-educated individuals around 14.8% of people remain over-
educated in the subsequent wave.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Log(wage) 6.77 0.70
Age 40.00 10.14
Age2 1703.29 826.10
FirmSize 5.06 2.45
HoursWorked 33.49 11.79
FullT ime 0.78 0.42
UnemploymentHistory 0.59 4.07
SpouseEmployed 0.85 0.35
Table 2
Job categories Over-Educated DOver-Educated
Service Class Higher 2,174 377
Service Class Lower 9,626 1,100
Routine Non-Manual 57,075 8,637
Personal service 72,544 10,427
Small Proprietor w Employees 3,675 565
Small Proprietor w/o Employees 3,872 593
Farmers, Smallholders 53,994 8,304
Foreman, Technicians 3,877 583
Skilled Manual 55,312 8,540
Semi, Unskilled Manual 74,716 10,733
Agricultural 3,590 563
Percentage 38.4% 14.8%
Table 3
19
Figure 1 shows the proportion of workers in employment in the UK who are
over-qualified or under-qualified. The figure shows that post 2008 the proportion
of over-qualified has increased.
Figure 1: Over and Under Educated as a Proportion of those in Employment
4.1 Job Flows
Job flows help in understanding the flow of workers between diﬀerent jobs. Figure
2 shows the job move rate. This is defined as the proportion of workers who
change jobs between two periods. The figure aslso shows the reasons for the job
moves.
Figure 2: Contributions to Job Moves by Reason for Leaving Last Job (%)
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The job move rate is the proportion of workers who move between one employer
and another each period. “Other reasons” for move include workers whose tem-
porary job finished, workers who gave up work for health reasons, for family or
personal reasons, for education or for some other reason.
During the economic downturn (2008-2009), the rate of job to job moves fell by
more than a third. During 2009 since the redundancy rate increased, the number
of people resigning from their jobs fell markedly, reflecting the unwillingness
of workers to risk moving from their current positions in a climate of elevated
economic uncertainty. From 2011 onwards the rate of job-to-job transitions rose
steadily.
While figure 2 shows the rate of job-to-job transitions, figure 3 shows the nature
of the jobs towards which individuals are moving to. Figure 3 shows the con-
tributions of job-to-job transitions both within the same industry and between
diﬀerent industries. Among the former are workers who arrange to move to a
new post within the same industry – perhaps taking with them the specific skills
and knowledge that they have acquired in their current position. Among the
latter, are a group who are moving between industries – either seeking to change
direction, or to deploy their skills in a new way.
Figure 3: Moves within and Between Industries (as a %age of total employees)
Figure 3 shows that while both types of move were aﬀected by the economic
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downturn, moves between industries fell more than moves within industries. :
This could either be due to workers willing to take fewer risks, or because employ-
ers sought to benefit from the training and development of other similar firms,
rather than investing in new staﬀ.
Figure 4 shows the transitions of two diﬀerent types of workers from and into the
two occupational groups.
Figure 4: Transitions to and from High and Low- Skilled Occuptaions (as % age
of total employees each period)
Higher turnover among the less-educated workers in the low-skill occupations
has a greater contribution to in- and out-flows compared with high-skill occupa-
tions since they have a higher transition rate throughout the period. This high
rate of turnover fell sharply during the downturn, reducing job mobility among
lower occupational groups relative to higher-occupational groups. Low-skill oc-
cupations comprise elementary occupations, sales & customer services operators
and process, plant & machine operatives, while high-skill occupations comprise
managers, directors & senior oﬃcials, professional occupations and associate pro-
fessional & technical occupations.
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4.2 Panel Data Analysis of Earnings Equations
I will now use the BHPS data to estimate the wage equations to see if the
wage penalties to over-education exist using panel data. I will use fixed eﬀects
estimation to see how much of the wage penalty is attributed to unobserved
heterogeneity. Table 4 shows the results of the regression equation 1.
Table 4 shows key educational returns for the ORU earnings equations estimated
using fixed eﬀects and OLS. The first and third columns show the fixed eﬀects
estimates for men and women in the ORU model respectively. The second and
fourth columns show the standard OLS wage equations using the ORU specifica-
tion for men and women respectively. Comparing the OLS estimates like Lindley
and McIntosh (2010) the incremental return to a level of required education is
always greater than that to all over-education levels. Not only that but there is a
direct negative impact on wages due to over-education. The largest increment for
required education is a move from level 4 to level 5 followed by a move from level
3 to level 4. Returns to required education are higher for men than for women
in general. However, the penalty for over-education is also higher for men than
for women.
Once the individual unobserved heterogeneity is controlled one would expect an
individual to earn the same regardless of the job if over-education is merely an
indicator of unobserved heterogeneity and thus the penalties would be close to
zero. This, however, is not the case as shown by columns 1 and 3. Controlling
for fixed eﬀects, men and women earn diﬀerent amounts depending on the level
of job they do which implies that over-education wage penalty is not a penalty
attributed to low ability. Like Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), in my model the
return to under-education is positive and significant. This is probably due to
how under-education is defined. A person is under-educated if they have less
education compared to their colleagues in a similar job. Hence, the wage for
under-education is more job specific than individual specific.
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Turning explicitly to the wage penalties associated with over-education one sees
that the higher the level of mismatch, the higher the wage penalty. Looking at the
OLS estimates for women and men the wage penalty for over-education is 0.143
log points for women and 0.115 log points for men if the level of over-education
is 1.
Male Female
FE OLS FE OLS
LogWage LogWage LogWage LogWage
RequiredEd2 0.0445** 0.240*** 0.0860*** 0.243***
(2.62) (25.86) (5.51) (25.40)
RequiredEd3 0.145*** 0.512*** 0.112*** 0.370***
(7.80) (47.47) (7.23) (38.78)
RequiredEd4 0.229*** 0.692*** 0.137*** 0.518***
(14.81) (84.73) (10.58) (64.24)
RequiredEd5 0.372*** 1.012*** 0.235*** 0.745***
(14.77) (101.74) (9.42) (79.81)
RequiredEd6 0.524*** 1.176*** 0.381*** 0.924***
(13.62) (68.86) (12.45) (66.86)
OverEd1 -0.0341*** -0.115*** -0.0456*** -0.143***
(-3.88) (-13.12) (-6.55) (-17.90)
OverEd2 -0.0994*** -0.222*** -0.0886*** -0.227***
(-11.34) (-25.11) (-12.42) (-27.89)
OverEd3 -0.175*** -0.422*** -0.138*** -0.338***
(-17.56) (-45.87) (-15.67) (-36.03)
OverEd4 -0.466*** -0.688*** -0.258*** -0.557***
(-16.71) (-24.49) (-10.89) (-19.32)
OverEd5 -0.437*** -0.964*** -0.384*** -0.653***
(-5.11) (-9.61) (-5.05) (-5.71)
UnderEd1 0.0620*** 0.0754*** 0.0263** 0.0588***
(5.92) (7.41) (3.11) (6.56)
UnderEd2 0.106*** 0.246*** 0.0433*** 0.103***
(10.30) (25.29) (4.39) (9.69)
UnderEd3 0.116*** 0.239*** 0.0847*** 0.217***
(8.68) (17.90) (7.88) (19.61)
Constant 3.349*** 4.402*** 3.516*** 4.815***
(73.04) (126.03) (84.93) (132.90)
N 36392 36392 33801 33801
24
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 4
Over-education of level 1 happens for instance if the required education for a job
is first degree and the individual has a highest qualification of a higher degree.
When the level of over-education increases to 2 the wage penalty associated with
it increases to 0.227 log points for women and 0.22 log points for men. This
continues increasing non-linearly till an over-education level of 5 where the wage
penalty associated with it is 0.653 log points for women and 0.964 log points for
men.
Fixed eﬀects estimates show a similar pattern. Whereas if unobserved hetero-
geneity was the sole cause of wage penalty controlling for this would imply that
the wage penalty associated with over-education is now zero. Columns 1 and
3 of table 4 show that although, as expected, the penalties for over-education
are lower for the fixed eﬀects estimation compared to OLS, the wage penalties
do not disappear. Thus, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity the
wage penalty continues to grow non-linearly with the extent of over-education.
Unobserved heterogeneity is no doubt a very important factor in explaining the
wage penalties to over-education but is not the only factor that explains the ex-
istence of over-education. This is consistent with Chevalier (2003) and Lindley
and McIntosh (2010).
One important thing to note is that in the fixed eﬀects specification, the eﬀect
of over-education on wages is due to the transitions between diﬀerently matched
jobs. It is likely that such transitions are not random. Thus, the results might
not be representative of all the over-educated workers. Thus, I explore the wage
analysis for more evidence on over-education.
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4.3 Returns to Over-Education by Future Matched Status
Table 5 shows the results for equations (2)-(5) estimated for workers observed in
1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006. To ensure a reasonable sample the data for men and
women are pooled. Equation 2 is the ORU wage equation estimated previously
but now estimated separately for the four years mentioned. The extent of over-
education is now estimated as a single variable with levels. The wage penalty
for over-education is similar for the cross-sections considered with the penalty
slightly greater in 1996. Thus, all the cross-sections examined tell a similar
story.
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1991 1996 2001 2006
Equation (2)
Unbalanced Panel (aˆ) -0.167*** -0.177*** -0.162*** -0.165***
(-7.16) (-8.36) (-11.29) (-11.46)
Equation (3) -0.0618*** - - -
Found a match in 1996 (fˆ) (-4.68) - - -
Diﬀerentital b/w Matched & OE
in 1996 (pˆ)
-0.233*** - - -
(-24.92) - - -
Found a match in 2001 (fˆ) 0.141*** 0.142*** - -
(12.70) (12.80) - -
Diﬀerentital b/w Matched & OE
in 2001 (pˆ)
-0.148*** -0.0463*** - -
(-19.73) (-8.90) - -
Found a match in 2006 (fˆ) 0.301*** 0.302*** 0.306*** -
(24.37) (24.44) (24.75) -
Diﬀerentital b/w Matched & OE
in 2006 (pˆ)
-0.147*** -0.0445*** 0.0144** -
(-19.57) (-8.58) (2.71) -
Equation (4)
Penalty to now matched,
previously over-educated,
workers, relative to those already
matched in 1991 (lˆ)
- -0.0329 -0.0244 -0.0143
- (-1.23) (-0.75) (-0.32)
Equation (5)
Penalty to now matched,
previously over-educated,
non-graduates, relative to
those already matched in
1991 (jˆ)
- -0.0273 -0.00541 0.0143
- (-0.90) (-0.15) (0.27)
Diﬀerential in penalty to
previous over-education between
non-graduates and graduates (sˆv)
- -0.0257 -0.0876 -0.104
- (-0.40) (-1.11) (-1.03)
Table5: Returns to a level of over-education by key cross sections
Equation 3 allows the estimated returns to over-education in any year to diﬀer
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according to whether or not an individual gets matched afterwards. The results
show that individuals who get matched in 1996 suﬀer a wage penalty of 0.23 log
points for being over-educated in a job in 1991. Thus, with the job requirements
held constant there will still be variation among wage penalty suﬀered by over-
educated employees at a level. Those who find jobs five years later already earn
a higher wage (or a smaller over-education wage penalty) during their period of
over-education.
The subsequent rows in the 1991 column of table 5 show that the longer a worker
has to wait to get matched, the smaller their advantage in terms of return to over-
education in 1991 relative to those who never get matched since the coeﬃcients
of pˆ are declining. Thus, those who find a well-match job sooner, earn higher
wages whilst still over-educated.
4.4 Wage Penalties to Previous Over-Education Status
Equations (4) and (5) show the impact of previous over-education status on
the wages of workers who are now matched. Equation 4 shows that matched
workers who were previously over-educated in 1991 earn wages around 0.01-0.3
log points lower compared to those already matched in 1991. Therefore, wages
are not only determined by job characteristics but also by unobserved ability of
workers who fill them, in this case determined by prior over-education experience.
Holding constant the job requirements, lower wages, apparently indicating lower
unobserved ability, are obtained for individuals previously over-educated. Thus,
over-education is partly a characteristic of unobserved ability. However, in this
analysis the results are not significant implying that the wage penalties are not
permanent.
The last two rows of table 5 show the negative impact of previous over-education
on matched wages for non-graduates and graduates. Again the results show that
the penalty for over-education is temporary. Not only this but the diﬀerence
between the wage penalty for non-graduates and graduates being insignificant
28
implies that over-education wage penalty is only temporary regardless of the
level of education. Thus, over-education is not an indication of lower ability
within a qualification category for both non-graduates and graduates. Short
periods of over-education are a natural event with no great future consequences,
as individuals learn on the job, before being oﬀered responsibilities equal to their
skills.
5 Horizontal Mismatch
So far the analysis on over-education has focused on the vertical mismatch
between an individual’s education level and the skill required in the job he/she
occupies. Recently the literature on over-education and wage penalty has focused
on the “task approach”. The idea here is to classify jobs according to their core
task requirements and then look at the set of skills necessary for these tasks.
Autor and Handel (2013) argue that the task approach has the potential to of-
fer a micro foundation for a link between the aggregate demand for skill in the
labour market to the specific skill demands of a given job activity.
However, there are two main challenges facing the task approach. The first is
conceptual. So far the task approach has been unable to make explicit links
between tasks, which are characteristics of jobs, and human capital, which is a
characteristic of workers. The second challenge is measurement. The data sets
available for studying employment and earnings give rough measures of workers’
human capital, such as education and experience, but almost no information on
their job tasks. To get around this limitation, researchers usually impute task
requirements to person-level observations.
The BHPS dataset does not have the required data to carry out this analysis so
I turned to the Skills and Employment Surveys Series Dataset, 1986, 1992, 1997,
2001, 2006 and 2012. The combined dataset includes comparable variables from
the six surveys of the series. Therefore, it includes variables that appear at least
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twice in the series. These are a series of nationally representative sample surveys
of individuals in employment aged 20-65 years old. The numbers of respondents
were: 4,047 in the 1986 survey; 3,855 in 1992; 2,467 in 1997; 4,470 in 2001; 7,787
in 2006; and 3,200 in 2012. For each survey, weights were computed to take
into account the diﬀerential probabilities of sample selection, the over-sampling
of certain areas and some small response rate variations between groups (defined
by sex, age and occupation). All of the analyses that follow use these weights.
The Skills and Employment Surveys Series Dataset provides information on job
characteristics only at the level of occupations, not workers. This makes ana-
lysis of within- occupation heterogeneity in task demands and its relationship to
earnings infeasible. I present evidence below both that job tasks diﬀer among
workers within an occupation and that this variation is an important determinant
of earnings.
The current paper provides an exploratory eﬀort to confront both of the limit-
ations above: a lack of conceptual structure for analysing the wage “returns” to
tasks and a lack of data for analysing the person-level relationship between tasks,
education, and wages. The second goal of my paper is to explore the value ad-
ded of task measurement at the person level for analysing job content and wage
determination.
In order to look at the extent to which within-occupation variation in self-
reported job tasks captures diﬀerences in wages, I regress log wages on task
scales, demographic variables, and occupation dummies. The task scale here is
a self-reported variation in job tasks such as routine repetitive tasks. I have also
included self-reported skill-mismatch and matching variables that predict if the
skill learnt during schooling is relevant to the job-tasks and if the past job skills
are relevant to the job tasks. If the self-reported variation in job tasks is a robust
predictor of wages, then there is evidence that self-reported task variation is a
useful predictor of job content even within occupations.
As a benchmark, table 6 shows the relationship between log wages, human capital,
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and demographic variables for the six cross-sections (years 1986, 1992, 1997, 2001,
2006, and 2012) that data is available for. Most of the variables have signs as
expected. The race dummies are mostly insignificant which shows that race is
not an important predictor of wage variation. The variable search is a dummy
variable that determines if an individual is actively searching on-the-job. Given
firms prefer workers to stick around the negative impact on earnings of on- the-job
search is as expected.
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1986 1992 1997 2001 2006 2012
Log Hours - - 1.606*** 1.771*** 1.712*** 1.694***
- - (12.56) (16.19) (22.93) (16.92)
University - - - 0.924*** 0.546*** 0.578***
- - - (7.21) (4.78) (3.37)
Masters & PhD - - - 1.122*** 0.977*** 0.478
- - - (4.66) (3.68) (1.29)
No Qualification - - - -0.679*** -1.299*** -0.956***
- - - (-5.11) (-14.23) (-5.97)
Work Experience 0.0188*** 0.0151*** 0.0447* 0.0578*** 0.0376*** 0.0599***
(6.88) (5.37) (2.09) (3.36) (3.92) (4.73)
Work Experience Sq -0.000391*** -0.000340*** -0.000929* -0.000999** -0.000690*** -0.00120**
(-6.22) (-5.48) (-2.00) (-2.67) (-3.47) (-3.14)
Female -0.333*** -0.248*** -0.267* -0.194* -0.323*** -0.0816
(-20.20) (-15.69) (-2.23) (-2.00) (-5.26) (-0.96)
Supervise - - 0.887*** 0.657*** 0.717*** 0.642***
- - (7.75) (6.96) (11.99) (7.67)
Permanent 0.0666* 0.0194 0.549** 0.551** 0.433*** 0.137
(2.42) (0.77) (2.59) (2.96) (3.30) (0.75)
Union 0.114*** 0.129*** 0.496*** 0.131 0.551*** 0.349***
(6.95) (7.90) (4.41) (1.42) (9.28) (4.05)
Black -0.0133 0.0233 0.311 -0.462 -0.431 -0.815**
(-0.17) (0.58) (0.72) (-1.31) (-1.89) (-2.80)
Asian -0.0402 -0.0239 1.055** -0.231 -0.261 -0.199
(-0.28) (-0.40) (2.79) (-0.82) (-1.34) (-0.97)
Trained 0.230*** 0.293*** 0.919*** 0.537*** 0.539*** 0.438***
(14.23) (18.04) (8.24) (5.90) (9.14) (5.30)
Eﬀort - 0.0163 0.0229 0.0747 0.0448 -0.0274
- (1.55) (0.30) (1.12) (1.05) (-0.44)
London - - 0.503** 0.650*** 0.390** 0.463**
- - (2.98) (4.31) (2.79) (2.86)
Private - - - 0.322 0.623*** 0.274
- - - (1.70) (4.78) (1.58)
First - - - - 0.719*** 0.698***
- - - - (3.58) (3.30)
Search -0.0461** - - - -0.137* -
(-2.83) - - - (-2.47) -
Constant 0.994*** 1.433*** 0.708 0.317 0.863** 1.826***
(26.84) (22.91) (1.19) (0.65) (2.62) (4.21)
N 2948 2654 2121 3883 5715 2176
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6: OLS Regressions of Log Wages on Demographic Variables
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Table 7 replaces the human capital and demographic controls with the task and
skill-matching scales that predict significant wage diﬀerentials. In 2001, a mis-
matched person, defined as a person who does not utilise his/her skills accumu-
lated during education, tends to earn 72% less than a person who utilises his/her
skills acquired during education. Figures for 2006 and 2012 are 59% less and 68%
less respectively.
1986 1992 1997 2001 2006 2012
Mismatched - - - -0.719** -0.592*** -0.676**
- - - (-3.11) (-3.81) (-2.60)
Repetitive Tasks - - -0.565*** -0.437*** -0.636*** -0.609***
- - (-4.19) (-4.05) (-8.72) (-5.71)
Past Skill - 0.122*** - 0.513*** 0.491*** 0.365***
- (15.61) - (11.10) (15.66) (7.54)
Constant - 1.392*** 8.789*** 7.499*** 7.397*** 8.087***
- (56.73) (75.79) (42.47) (61.87) (43.18)
N - 2726 2179 3974 6067 2287
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 7: OLS Regressions of Log Wages on Task Scales
In 1992, a person who utilises the skills acquired during past jobs tends to earn
12% more than a person who does not. Figures for 2001, 2006, and 2012 are 51%
more, 49% more, and 37% more respectively. The wage penalty for repetitive
tasks is 57% in 1997, 44% in 2001, 64% in 2006, and 61% in 2012.
Table 8 demonstrates that these three sets of variables; human capital and demo-
graphics, job task and skill matching, and occupation, capture distinct sources
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of wage variance. The repetitive task measure remains a significant predictor of
wages conditional on either human capital and demographic measures or a full
set of occupation dummies.
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1986 1992 1997 2001 2006 2012
Mismatched - - - -0.440* -0.246 0.0645
- - - (-2.07) (-1.79) (0.28)
Repetitive Tasks - - -0.286* -0.0918 -0.287*** -0.254**
- - (-2.36) (-0.91) (-4.36) (-2.68)
Past Skills - 0.0769*** - 0.161*** 0.179*** 0.148***
- (10.41) - (3.59) (6.11) (3.41)
Log Hours - - 1.611*** 1.704*** 1.615*** 1.634***
- - (12.83) (15.68) (21.74) (16.19)
University - - - 0.705*** 0.301** 0.396*
- - - (5.31) (2.58) (2.22)
Masters & PhD - - - 0.951*** 0.846** 0.341
- - - (3.84) (3.20) (0.90)
No Qualification - - - -0.583*** -1.176*** -0.959***
- - - (-4.36) (-12.99) (-5.93)
Work Experience 0.0169*** 0.0104*** 0.0294 0.0407* 0.0296** 0.0567***
(6.29) (3.84) (1.46) (2.55) (3.11) (4.42)
Work Experience Sq -0.000351*** -0.000249*** -0.000553 -0.000658 -0.000568** -0.00115**
(-5.67) (-4.19) (-1.30) (-1.95) (-2.89) (-2.98)
Female -0.298*** -0.211*** -0.142 -0.0918 -0.266*** -0.0347
(-18.03) (-13.71) (-1.17) (-0.94) (-4.31) (-0.40)
Supervise - - 0.646*** 0.415*** 0.470*** 0.483***
- - (5.28) (4.15) (7.46) (5.42)
Permanent 0.0558* 0.00143 0.520* 0.490** 0.430*** 0.136
(2.06) (0.06) (2.46) (2.63) (3.30) (0.75)
Union 0.139*** 0.163*** 0.613*** 0.244** 0.672*** 0.441***
(8.53) (10.29) (5.33) (2.60) (11.20) (4.98)
Black -0.0246 -0.000843 0.346 -0.361 -0.314 -0.636*
(-0.33) (-0.02) (0.80) (-1.02) (-1.39) (-2.22)
Asian -0.0424 -0.0284 1.183** -0.290 -0.237 -0.184
(-0.31) (-0.49) (3.11) (-1.03) (-1.23) (-0.88)
Trained 0.215*** 0.220*** 0.880*** 0.445*** 0.452*** 0.391***
(13.43) (13.60) (7.87) (4.82) (7.64) (4.67)
Eﬀort - -0.0109 0.0118 0.0312 0.000362 -0.0682
- (-1.06) (0.15) (0.46) (0.01) (-1.07)
London - - 0.484** 0.664*** 0.346* 0.380*
- - (2.86) (4.36) (2.49) (2.32)
Private - - - 0.210 0.521*** 0.118
- - - (1.09) (4.00) (0.67)
First - - - - 0.556** 0.494*
- - - - (2.76) (2.22)
Search -0.0457** - - - -0.0868 -
(-2.85) - - - (-1.56) -
Constant 0.972*** 1.365*** 0.893 0.434 1.098** 1.901***
(26.63) (22.48) (1.50) (0.87) (3.27) (4.12)
N 2948 2626 2121 3891 5712 2172
t statistics in parentheses
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 8: OLS Regressions of Log Wages on Task Scales, Demographic Variables, and
Occupation Dummies
Similarly the past skill variable remains a significant predictor of wages condi-
tional on either human capital and demographic measures or a full set of oc-
cupation dummies. However, the mismatch variable only remains a significant
predictor of wage in 2001 at 5% level of significance.
While statistical significance does not imply economic significance, the magnitude
of the relationship between tasks and wages net of other variables is still signi-
ficant and substantial. Within occupations, a person utilising past job skills
predicts an 8% increase in wage earnings in 1992. Figures for 2001, 2006, and
2012 are 16% increase, 18% increase and 15% increase respectively. Similarly the
figures for repetitive tasks in 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2012 are 29% decrease, 9%
decrease, 29% decrease and 25% decrease respectively. Although the eﬀects are
diminished they remain large and significant. Among these three measures, the
mismatch variable proves least robust, losing significance when human capital
and demographic controls, and occupational controls are included. These results
suggest that the self-reported job tasks show sizable diﬀerences in job activities
among workers, both within and between occupations.
6 Matching Areas of Study to Occupations
As an added analysis on the eﬀect of horizontal mismatch on wages I focus on
the 2006 cross-section that has the most detailed breakdown of job type. I limit
analysis on individuals with an undergraduate degree because that is the only
point where data is available for the subjects studied. Unfortunately that limits
the data to only 1498 individuals. Thus, an analysis on the eﬀect of mismatch
on wages cannot be done through a regression. There are a total of 197 diﬀerent
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occupations and 11 diﬀerent undergraduate areas of study, namely mathematics,
computing, physical science and engineering, biological science, social science,
English and cultural studies, art and design studies, business and management
studies, humanities, law, and medicine. For each occupation I searched for the
entry-level requirements on job sites (such as Prospects) and marked as mis-
matched all individuals who are in a particular occupation but have studied a
subject area that is unrelated to that occupation. For example, if an individual
has studied biological science but is working as a financial institution manager,
then that individual is considered mismatched. Surprisingly, using this definition
of mismatch the number of individuals who are mismatched for each subject cat-
egory is very high. In particular of the 55 individuals who have studied maths
in their undergraduate, 39 are mismatched (71%). The figures for the rest of
the occupations are as follows, 32 out of 61 for computing (52%), 138 out of 169
for engineering (82%), 86 out of 108 for biological sciences (80%), 131 out of
162 (81%) for social sciences, 80 out of 86 for English and cultural studies 93%,
56 out of 75 for art and design studies (75%), 125 out of 185 for business and
management studies (68%), 93 out of 96 for humanities (97%), 32 out of 56 for
law (57%), and 7 out of 34 for medicine (21%).
In order to estimate the relationship between wage and each of the 11 mismatched
categories I calculate the correlation matrix between the mismatched variable and
log of wage. Table 9 shows the results. As the results show only three mismatch
variables (mathematics, computing and social science) show a significant negative
impact on wages at 5% level. However, this result should be taken with extreme
caution since the data available is very limited.
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Lwage Maths Comp Engineer Bio SocialS English Art BM Human Law Medicine
Lwage 1.0000
Maths -0.3484* 1.0000
(0.0190)
Comp -0.2985* 1.0000
(0.0316)
Engineer -0.0775 1.0000
(0.3663)
Bio -0.1061 1.0000
(0.3037)
SocialS -0.2407* 1.0000
(0.0046)
English 0.0188 1.0000
(0.8769)
Art -0.1652 1.0000
(0.2372)
BM -0.0979 1.0000
(0.2447)
Human -0.0621 1.0000
(0.5890)
Law -0.1965 1.0000
(0.2580)
Medicine 0.2038 1.0000
(0.3179)
p-value in parentheses
* p<0.05
Table 9: Correlation matrix of log of wage and the 11 mismatched variables
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7 Conclusion
This paper analysed the hypothesis that over-education and mismatch have a
negative impact on the wages of workers. Over-education is partly an indicator
of low-ability among groups of workers who share similar qualifications but have
unobserved heterogeneity amongst them in terms of ability. This comes from the
fact that using the BHPS dataset, the workers who were over-educated in 1991
did not all receive the same wage penalty to over-education even after controlling
for the required qualifications for their jobs. The over-education wage penalty is
smaller amongst workers who would get matched in 5 years. This implies that
some of the heterogeneity amongst the over-educated, especially those with the
lowest ability remain over-educated longer. However, the over-education wage
penalty grows smaller and smaller in subsequent years, and the results for wage
penalty for workers who eventually get matched become statistically insignificant.
Like Lindley and McIntosh (2010), the results show heterogeneity in skill amongst
the over- educated. More trained individuals with higher initial earnings are
more likely to escape over-education. However, unlike Lindley and McIntosh
(2010) there is no evidence of heterogeneity between workers who experience
a spell of over-education compared to those who do not, after controlling for
the qualifications obtained. This comes from the fact that the results of wage
penalty for a matched worker who was previously over-educated in 1991 are
insignificant as indicated by the high p-values and low t-values. This holds true
for both non-graduates and graduates. Thus, temporary over-education is not
an indicator of low-ability but merely a reflection of experience gained over the
years to complement the qualification before moving to a matched job.
The results show the presence of unobserved ability between workers; amongst
workers who were always in a matched job and amongst workers who were over-
educated but later found a matched job. None of our workers remains perman-
ently over-educated. Thus, controlling for heterogeneity explains the diﬀerence
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in wages amongst those currently matched and those over-educated as shown
by the fixed eﬀects estimates for women and men. A substantial portion of
over-education wage penalty observed in the OLS estimates is removed after
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
When using the Skills and Employment Surveys Series Dataset and looking at
the horizintal mismatch between workers, it turns out that once the occupation
variables are controlled for mismatch is not a significant predictor of wage penalty.
However, at the task-level repetitive tasks and past experience in a job remain
significant predictors of wage even after controlling for occupation.
A lot of work needs to be done on the horizontal mismatch and task approach
to understand the relationship between mismatch and wages at the person level.
More data needs to be collected at the individual level to get a more detailed
picture of a workers human capital in terms of the area of study and the type
of job-tasks involved. This would be the next step towards understanding the
variation in wages of workers in the United Kingdom.
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Part II
Wage Determination with On-the-Job
Search and Bargaining
9 Abstract
On-the-job search by workers is an important feature in labour markets. In this
paper I have analysed how this phenomenon aﬀects the structure of employment
and wages in an economy where high and low ability workers compete for jobs. I
find that when all workers search on-the-job the outcome is worse for the labour
market position of untrained workers compared to when only mismatched workers
search while employed. This is because it causes a move in the job distribution
towards high-technology firms and decreases the overall stability of unskilled jobs.
These results are consistent for when the motive of job-to-job transitions is the
pursuit of a better match or when identical workers compete in same job types.
On-the-job search is a way in which workers reduce the extent of mismatch and
firms react to this. However, this interaction implies that when more workers try
to relocate the friction in the market reduces the eﬃciency of resource allocation
(by increasing mismatch) and it also creates more wage inequality between the
diﬀerent types of workers.
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10 Introduction
Economies are characterised by a significant amount of skill mismatch. According
to McGuinness (2006) using post 1980 data the skill mismatch range is reported
as follows, 13-50 per cent for the United States, 31 per cent for Canada, 11-40.7
per cent for United Kingdom, 11.5-17.5 per cent for Germany, 17 per cent for
Spain, 20 per cent for Ireland and 11.85-30.6 per cent for Netherlands. A possible
explanation for the existence of mismatch is search frictions. However, workers
move between jobs, which in principle suggests that some of this mismatch may
not be permanent.
Occupational mobility and reallocation leads to temporary mismatch in an eco-
nomy because the labour market is characterised by frictions. There is evidence
in literature for on-the-job search. Fallick and Fleischman (2001) use data on US
labour market to show that job-to-job transitions account for 50% of separations
among college workers. Pissarides (1994) shows that job-to-job flows account
for at least 40% of all separations in the UK in 1980s, while in Germany Bach-
man (2006) estimates that job-to-job flows accounted for about 35% of monthly
separations during 1980-2000.
From time to time workers reallocate; sometimes within the same occupation
and sometimes they switch occupations. Hall (2006) uses data from the US
labour market and estimates the job finding rate to be around 40% per month
while Brainard and Perry (2002) estimate the US quarterly job finding rate to
be around 70% for the first year of search.
Reallocation occurs not only through unemployment but also through employ-
ment. Taylor and Longhi (2011) show that for both employed and unemployed
job seekers the probability of finding a new job in the same occupation as the
previous job is relatively low (around 30%), while more than one half experi-
ence a major occupational change. Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) suggest that
employer-to-employer transitions are around 2.7% for the US from 1994-2004.
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Kambouro and Manovski (2008) suggest that in the United States among male
workers over the 1968-1997 period the average level of occupational mobility at a
one-digit level is around 13% and the industry mobility is around 10%. At a one-
digit-level occupational mobility has increased from 10% to 15%, while industry
mobility has increased from 7% to 12%. Occupational and industry switches are
fairly permanent: around 30% of the workers switching occupations (industries)
return to their one-digit occupation (industry) within a four-year period after
the switch.
The trends in mobility of unemployed workers diﬀer substantially from employed
workers. Taylor and Longhi (2011) used data from the Labour Force Survey
to show that employed and unemployed job seekers in Great Britain originate
from diﬀerent occupations and find jobs in diﬀerent occupations. They found
substantial diﬀerences in occupational mobility between job seekers: employed
job seekers are most likely to move to occupations paying higher average wages
relative to their previous occupation, while unemployed job seekers are most likely
to move to lower paying occupations. This suggests that for unemployed people
a change in occupation is likely to have a negative impact on future wage growth
while for employed people an occupational change is more often associated with
better prospects for wage growth.
This model speaks about workers of diﬀerent skills that face jobs with diﬀerent
skill requirements. Random search generates a temporary skill mismatch since
highly qualified workers can be employed in jobs with low skill requirements. On-
the-job search allows the workers to obtain a better employment. This is a model
in which a brain surgeon can be a taxi driver but not the other way around. It
is in that sense that the model can be linked to occupational mismatch.
Wage inequality and occupational mobility are interrelated phenomena. Using
data from the US, Kambouro and Manovski (2008) show changes in wage in-
equality in the U.S. from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s. They show that
inequality of hourly wages has increased over the period − the variance of logs
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has increased from 0.225 to 0.354, or 57%, while the Gini coeﬃcient has increased
from 0.258 to 0.346, or 34%. Most of the increase in wage inequality was due to
rising inequality within narrowly defined age-education subgroups. The increase
in wage inequality reflects increased dispersion throughout the entire wage distri-
bution. Individual earnings became substantially more volatile. Kambouro and
Manovski (2008) show that between-occupation inequality is much higher than
within occupation inequality. The Within-Group measure of wages, displays an
increase in inequality between occupations from 0.067 to 0.141 and an increase
in the inequality within occupations from 0.109 to 0.140.
While workers search for jobs during unemployment as well as during employ-
ment, frictions in the market imply that there will always be some level of un-
employment in the economy. Since the labour market is not frictionless it also
means that the economy will always be characterised by some level of skill mis-
match. This mismatch is reduced with a higher job turnover. However, this skill
mismatch is never reduced to zero unless a specific policy is introduced that bars
workers from taking up jobs not suited to their level of skill. As long as highly
educated workers find it profitable to accept jobs requiring a low skill, there will
be a positive amount of mismatch in a market with frictions.
This paper explores the concept of mismatch between workers and jobs and how it
aﬀects wages in a market. Wages are determined through Cahuc, Postal-Vinay,
Robin (2006), through bargaining between employers and workers under com-
plete information and Bertrand Competition between firms. Wages are determ-
ined through a game that generates a result like the generalised Nash-bargaining
solution. Workers search on-the-job to improve their employment prospects. The
paper shows that wage inequalities are exacerbated by on-the-job search, which is
consistent with literature. The first section of the paper gives a general literature
on the topic. This is followed by an explanation of the model. To begin with
only mismatched workers search on-the-job which is an assumption that is later
relaxed.
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This paper contributes to the existing literature on wage inequality with on-the-
job search by exploring the wage determination through a sequential bargaining
game. It also allows for all worker types to search for jobs not only when they are
unemployed but also when they are employed. As discussed, workers reallocate
not only through unemployment but also through employment so this logical
extension further adds realism to the model.
On-the-job search is a way in which workers reduce the extent of mismatch and
firms react to this. However, this interaction implies that when more workers try
to relocate the friction in the market reduces the eﬃciency of resource allocation
(by increasing mismatch) and it also creates more wage inequality between the
diﬀerent types of workers.
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11 Literature Review
Although, much has been said about the existence of skill mismatch and job-to-
job transitions, there is insuﬃcient literature on mismatch and on-the-job search
coupled together with bargaining for wages between firms and workers and among
firms. It is important to look at the eﬀect of bargaining between searching workers
and firms since evidence shows that workers search on-the-job for prospects of
better employment. In this paper I will study the eﬀect of skill mismatch on
wages by developing a search-based model allowing for on-the-job search and
wage bargaining. Like Albrecht and Vroman (2002) I consider an economy with
heterogeneous workers and firms. Workers are of two types, highly educated ones
that are considered skilled labourers and less educated ones that are considered
unskilled labourers. This distribution of skill is exogenous in my model. Firms
post vacancies that require either a high or a low skill level. The distribution
of vacancies is endogenously determined in the model. Technology is such that
while highly educated workers are able to occupy both types of vacancies, the
less educated workers are only able to occupy low skilled vacancies. Thus, while
a surgeon can operate on a patient and perform janitorial duties, a janitor can
only perform janitorial duties and cannot operate on patients. By definition the
surgeon is a highly educated worker while the janitor is a less educated worker.
Although highly educated workers can occupy both types of vacancies, they do
not produce more than less educated workers in a low skilled job. While highly
educated workers can occupy low skilled vacancies the match produced is less
than ideal since such workers are more likely to break the match and move to a
well-matched job. In such a framework the worker’s outside option determines
his/her wage. Since actual gains from trade accrue to the worker and not the firm,
mismatched workers compensate their employers by accepting a wage reduction.
Consistent with Shi (2002), my model has a similar restriction that comes from
the literature on skill heterogeneity that assumes that most jobs require a min-
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imum skill requirement. Other authors that use a similar approach to skill het-
erogeneity include Vroman (1987), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Dolado,
Jansen and Jimeno (2008).
Like Bonilla and Burdett (2010) this model allows for on-the-job search but in-
stead of using a lottery system to determine wages, it uses sequential bargaining.
It is similar to that of Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2008) in that it deals with
heterogeneous agents but allows for on-the-job search. However, Dolado, Jansen
and Jimeno (2008) use a linear splitting the surplus rule for wage determination
compared to the sequential bargaining rule used here. Due to labour market
frictions, there is unemployment in equilibrium. The matching function is ad-
opted from Diamond (1982) and Mortensen (1982). Unlike Shi (2002) search
is undirected such that highly educated workers encounter low skilled vacan-
cies with a probability per unit time of the fraction of vacancies that require
low-skill levels. Similarly, less educated workers encounter high-skilled vacancies
(and thus are unable to form a match) with a probability proportional to the
fraction of vacancies that require high-skill levels. Thus, the undirected search
process is used to capture the idea that given the overall labour market condi-
tions less educated workers are better oﬀ, the greater the proportion of low-skilled
vacancies available and vice versa for highly educated workers. Similarly, firms
advertising low-skilled vacancies are better oﬀ, the greater the fraction of less
educated workers in the economy. Equilibrium in the model is determined using
free-entry conditions that state that the value of maintaining vacancies is zero
and the steady state conditions that state that the flow of workers into and out
of unemployment and employment are equal.
Several papers published are relevant to my model. The model introduced by
Albrecht and Vroman (2002) is one. While their model deals with unemployed
workers searching, my model allows both the unemployed and the employed work-
ers to search on-the-job. In this respect, my model is closest to that of Dolado,
Jansen and Jimeno (2008) who look at on-the-job search in a matching model
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with heterogeneous agents. However, my model also allows all types of work-
ers to search on-the-job, where as Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2008) only allow
mismatched workers to search while employed. Papers by McKenna (1996) and
Gautier (1999) are also related since they use the same definition of skill diﬀer-
ential as this model. However, while in this model, mismatched workers have the
same productivity in low-skilled jobs as less educated workers, Gautier (1999)
postulates that mismatched workers may or may not be more productive than
less educated workers in low-skilled jobs. Thus, highly educated workers might be
worse at simple repetitive jobs or they may be better at simple tasks, for instance
waiters who know several languages. Like McKenna (1996) and Gautier (1999)
my model does not allow less educated workers to match with complex jobs. Like
Albrecht and Vroman (2002), the contact rate in my model is endogenous, which
is diﬀerent from Acemoglu (1999) who works with undirected search with het-
erogeneous agents and a constant exogenous contact rate. Bonilla and Burdett
(2010) also work with a constant exogenous contact rate. However, their model is
based on homogenous agents. Other related literatures are Mortensen and Piss-
arides (1999) and Shi (2002), both working with heterogenous agents, however,
the search process in their models is a directed one rather than an undirected
one. Thus, the equilibrium that they achieve is that of ex-post segmentation
with perfect matching.
While the above models allow for search when workers are unemployed, the
current model allows for on-the-job search by both unemployed and employed
workers. Related to on-the-job search is a vast literature that assumes that only
workers search while employed or unemployed, while firms without vacancies do
not search. However, papers by Kiyotaki and Lagos (2007) and Burdett, Imai,
and Wright (2003) develop more general models where both parties in a bilateral
match may choose to search. In this model, initially only mismatched workers
may search on-the-job. This is relaxed later. Search is assumed to be costless
such that all mismatched workers necessarily search on-the-job. This is similar
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to Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2008).
This model follows Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) in assuming that in
wage determination, firms consider the worker’s outside option. Thus, the incum-
bent firm and the newly contacted firm bargain for the service of highly educated
employees. However, while Pissarides (1994) and Shimer (2006) have models in
which firms cannot commit to such a wage oﬀer, this model assumes that all
wages are binding. This paper deals with all the above issues. After stating the
value functions, the model first assumes that only mismatched workers search
on-the-job. I compare the model for the case when firms have all the bargaining
power to the case where both firms and workers have equal bargaining power.
On-the-job search is considered costless and mismatched workers always search
on-the-job. Later I look at the case when all workers are searching on-the-job.
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12 Only Mismatched Workers Search On-the-Job
12.1 Basic Framework
I will develop a steady state matching model of unemployment. There are two
sectors producing a single good. There is a continuum of workers with mass equal
to one. Time is continuous. Agents are risk neutral. Agents discount future at
the rate r > 0. Workers and firms are heterogeneous in skill and technology
respectively. At each instant µ > 0 workers die.
There are two types of workers, untrained e = 0 and trained e = 1, that is,
e✏[ 0,1] . The fraction of untrained workers is exogenously determined and is
given by  0 .
A worker can be unemployed or employed. Let   be the eﬀort with which em-
ployed workers search on-the-job. An unemployed worker receives a flow pay-oﬀ
b from leisure, where 0 < b < 1.
Each employer employs at most one worker. There are two types of jobs available
in the labour market, low-technology (L) and high-technology (H) : j✏{L,H}.
While any type of worker can fill a low-technology job, only trained workers
are productive in high-technology jobs. In low-technology firm, output yL is
independent of the worker’s training e. In high-technology firms, output is yH if
e = 1, and is zero otherwise.
There is free entry of firms into each technology sector, where free entry implies
new firms in each sector make zero expected profit. The firms pay a cost c for
posting any vacancy.
There is job destruction which occurs at a rate of   > 0. There is also turnover
through on-the-job search, which I now describe in detail.
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12.2 Matching
Let U0 be the measure of unemployed workers who are untrained and U1 the
measure of unemployed workers who are trained. Let E0 be the measure of
employed workers who are untrained and E1 the measure of employed workers
who are trained. Let E1L denote the measure of mismatched workers described
as trained workers who are employed in a low-technology firm.
Unemployed workers and vacancies are assumed to meet each other according to
a random matching technology, where M = M(K,V ) denotes the flow number
of contacts.
K = U0 +U1 + E1L, is the aggregate job search eﬀort because only unemployed
and mismatched workers search for jobs. V = VL + VH , is the total vacancies.
Assuming constant returns, define labour market tightness ✓ = V/K and m(✓) =
M(K,V )
K = M(1, ✓) which describes the arrival rate of job oﬀers per unit eﬀort.
I assume that m0(✓) > 0 and that lim✓!1m0(✓) = 0.
Unemployed workers sample job oﬀers randomly at Poisson rate m(✓). Trained
workers employed in low-technology firms may also search for a better job and
the arrival rate of oﬀers to on-the-job searchers is  m(✓).   is exogenous.
Similarly, vacancies meet unemployed workers at rate m(✓)✓ . I assume this rate is
decreasing in ✓ and that lim✓!0[m(✓)/✓] =1.
13 Wage Determination
Wages are determined using the Cahuc, Postal-Vinay, Robin (2006) bargaining
framework. Given contact and a gain to trade exists, the wage contract is nego-
tiated following a set of rules that I now explain.
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Wages are bargained over by workers and employers in a complete information
context. Wage contracts stipulate a fixed wage that can be renegotiated by
mutual agreement only: renegotiations thus occur only if one party can credibly
threaten the other to leave the match if the latter refuses to renegotiate. There
are no renegotiation costs.
When between-employer competition for labour services is not perfect, firm-
worker matches are associated with a positive rent, defined as the expected value
of future match output flows net of the worker’s and firm’s outside options.
When an unemployed worker meets a firm, the wage is determined as the worker’s
outside option plus a share   of the match surplus. This game delivers the
generalized Nash-bargaining solution, where the worker receives a constant share
  of the match rent. This latter parameter   is referred to as the worker’s
bargaining power.
When an employed worker contacts an outside firm, the situation becomes more
favourable to the worker because she/he can now force the incumbent and poach-
ing employers to compete. Competition between the two employers over the
worker’s services can be seen as an auction where the bidder with the higher
valuation wins and pays the second price. I first assume that only trained work-
ers employed in low-technology firms search on-the-job. This assumption will be
relaxed later.
13.1 Equilibrium Wage Bargaining
13.1.1 Untrained workers e = 0
While unemployed, let V ue denote the expected lifetime value of a worker of type
e being unemployed using an optimal strategy. If employed at type j✏{L,H}
firm on wage w, let V je (w) denote the expected lifetime payoﬀ.
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Since, the flow payoﬀ during unemployment b > 0, an untrained worker has
no gains to trade with a high-technology firm. This is because these workers
receive b > 0 during unemployment while the maximum they can receive in the
high-technology firm is their productivity which is 0.
When the worker is paid her/his marginal productivity, the employer makes zero
marginal profit on this worker, who therefore receives the entire match value
V L0
 
yL
 
. Further assuming that a vacant job has zero value to the employer, the
diﬀerence between the match value V L0
 
yL
 
and the unemployment value defines
the match surplus:
⇥
V L0
 
yL
   V u0 ⇤.
When an unemployed worker is matched with a low-technology firm, she/he
obtains her/his reservation utility, V u0 , plus a share   of the maximum match
surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity yL
in the low-technology firm. Let w be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a
contact between an untrained, unemployed worker and a low technology firm.
Equilibrium bargaining implies w solves:
V L0 (w) = V
u
0 +  
⇥
V L0
 
yL
   V u0 ⇤ (6)
13.1.2 Bargaining with trained workers
Suppose a trained unemployed worker contacts a low-technology firm. The ne-
gotiated wage, denoted wuL, solves:
V L1 (w
uL) = V u1 +  
⇥
V L1
 
yL
   V u1 ⇤ (7)
When a trained, unemployed worker is matched with a low-technology firm,
she/he obtains her/his reservation utility, V u1 , plus a share   of the maximum
match surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal produc-
tivity yL in the low-technology firm. The worker only accepts the wage oﬀer if
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V L1
 
yL
 
> V u1 , otherwise she/he prefers to stay unemployed.
When an unemployed worker is matched with a high-technology firm, she/he
obtains her/his reservation utility, V u1 , plus a share   of the maximum match
surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity yH
in the high-technology firm.
Let wuH be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained,
unemployed worker and a high technology firm. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
V H1 (w
uH) = V u1 +  
⇥
V H1
 
yH
   V u1 ⇤ (8)
When a trained worker employed in a low-technology firm receives an outside
job oﬀer from another low-technology firm, a three-player bargaining process
is started between the worker, her/his initial employer, and the employer who
made the outside oﬀer. No employer will pay more than match productivity. The
auction forces a low-technology firm to place a bid equal to marginal productivity,
yL, of the worker in that job. The worker stays in her/his current job but her/his
wage is raised to the marginal productivity in the low-technology firm.
Let wLL be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained,
worker employed in a low-technology firm meeting another low-technology firm
with a Bertrand Competition. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
wLL = yL (9)
When a type-e = 1 employee in a j = L firm receives an outside oﬀer from a
j = H firm, the worker moves to the j = H firm, where she/he gets wage wLH :
wLH = yL (10)
This section determines W =
⇥
w,wuL, wuH , wLH , wLL
⇤
as a function of V ue and
V je (w). The next step is to determine V ue and V je (w) consistent with W (e).
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13.2 Worker’s Problem
13.3 Untrained Worker e = 0
Let ⇣ = VLVL+VH denote the fraction of vacancies which are oﬀered by low-technology
firms. As untrained workers have no gains to trade with high-technology firms,
their eﬀective arrival rate of job oﬀers is ⇣m(✓) during unemployment.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type e worker with e = 0 when
unemployed is:
(r + µ)V u0 = b+m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L0 (w)  V u0
⇤
(11)
The value of unemployment for an untrained worker incorporates the assumption
that an untrained worker is not productive in a high-technology job. The gains
from trade from the job are
⇥
V L0 (w)  V u0
⇤
. The flow payoﬀ from unemployment
is b.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type e worker with e = 0 hired
from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V L0 (w) = w +  
⇥
V u0   V L0 (w)
⇤
(12)
The flow value of an untrained worker hired from unemployment equals the sum of
the flow return, w, plus the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u0   V L0 (w)
⇤
from the job breaking.
Note the 2 equations (11-12) which determine V u0 and V L0 (w). As equation (6)
determined w(a) there are 3 equations for 3 unknowns.
Lemma 1
For an e = 0 worker, wage w and corresponding value functions V u0 and V L0 (w)
a solution exists and is bound for all ⇣ 2 [0, 1] and ✓   0. Equilibrium wage
bargaining implies:
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w =  yL + (1   ) b (13)
V u0 =
b+m(✓)⇣ 
h
yL b
r+µ+ +m(✓)⇣
i
r + µ
(14)
V L0 (w) =
b+m(✓)⇣ 
h
yL b
r+µ+ +m(✓)⇣
i
r + µ
+  

yL   b
r + µ+   +m (✓) ⇣
 
(15)
13.4 Trained Worker e = 1
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 when unem-
ployed is:
(r + µ)V u1 = b+m (✓) {⇣[V L1 (wuL)  V u1 ] + (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
wuH
   V u1 ⇤} (16)
The value of unemployment for a trained worker incorporates the assumption
that these workers might be productive in both low and high technology firms.
An unemployed trained worker meets a low-technology firm at an arrival rate of
m (✓) ⇣ and a high-technology firm at an arrival rate of m (✓) (1  ⇣). The gains
from trade with a high-technology firm are [V H1 (wuH)   V u1 ]. Assuming surplus
exists the gains from trade with a low-technology firm are [V L1 (wuL)  V u1 ]. The
flow payoﬀ from unemployment is b.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 employed in
a j = L firm hired from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V L1
 
wuL
 
= wuL +  
⇥
V u1   V L1
 
wuL
 ⇤
+ m (✓) (1  ⇣) ⇥V H1  wLH   V L1  wuL ⇤
+ m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L1
 
yL
   V L1  wuL ⇤ (17)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in low-technology
firm hired from unemployment equals the sum of the flow return, wuL, plus
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the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1   V L1
 
wuL
 ⇤
from the job break-
ing up and the capital gains from on-the-job search. With an arrival rate of
 m (✓) (1  ⇣), the worker meets a high-technology firm and gains [V H1
 
wLH
  
V L1
 
wuL
 
]. With an arrival rate of  m (✓) ⇣ the worker meets a low-technology
firm. Assuming moving is costly, the worker stays with the current employer but
is able to bargain her/his wage to wLL = yL, where yL > wuL. The gain to the
worker in this case is
⇥
V L1
 
yL
   V L1  wuL ⇤.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 employed in
a j = H firm hired from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V H1
 
wuH
 
= wuH +  
⇥
V u1   V H1
 
wuH
 ⇤
(18)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in a high-technology
firm hired from unemployment equals the sum of the flow return, wuH , plus the
expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1   V H1
 
wuH
 ⇤
from the job breaking
up.
Note the 3 equations (16-18) which determine V u1 and V
j
1 (w
ij). As equations (7-8)
and (10) determined wuL, wuH and wLH there are 6 equations for 6 unknowns.
Lemma 2
For an e = 1 worker with wage wij and corresponding value functions V u1 and
V j1 (w
ij) for i = u, L,H and j = L,H a solution exists and is bound for all
⇣ 2 [0, 1] and ✓   0.
Proof
Equilibrium wage bargaining implies:
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V H1 (y
H) =
yH +  V u1
r + µ+  
2 ⇥b, yH⇤ (19)
V L1 (y
L) =
yL +  V u1 +  m (✓) (1  ⇣)V H1
 
wLH
 
r + µ+   +  m (✓) (1  ⇣) 2
⇥
b, yH
⇤
(20)
V H1 (w
LH) = (1   )V u1 +  V L1 (yL) 2
⇥
b, yH
⇤
(21)
V H1 (w
uH) = (1   )V u1 +  V H1 (yH) 2
⇥
b, yH
⇤
(22)
V L1 (w
uL) = (1   )V u1 +  V L1 (yL) 2
⇥
b, yH
⇤
(23)
V u1 =
b+  m(✓)
⇥
⇣V L1 (y
L) + (1  ⇣)V H1 (yH)
⇤
r + µ+m (✓)  
2 ⇥b, yH⇤ (24)
Each value function is continuous. Further, each value function is a function of
another value function multiplied by a discount factor < 1. Also, each value
function is bounded between
⇥
b, yH
⇤
. By Brouwer fixed-point theorem, there
exists at least one continuously diﬀerentiable solution on
⇥
b, yH
⇤
.
14 Firm’s Problem
Let J je (w) denote the expected lifetime value of a firm of type j✏{L,H} employing
a worker with training e 2 (0, 1), paying wage w. There is free entry of firms into
each technology sector. Free entry implies new firms in each sector make zero
expected profit. The value to the firm of a vacancy is zero.
14.1 Low-Technology Firm
Consider a low-technology firm holding a vacancy. Trained workers might find it
worthwhile to accept these jobs.
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The expected payoﬀ of a low-technology firm holding a vacancy is:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
U0
K
JL0 (w)
 
+

U1
K
JL1
 
wuL
   
(25)
Conditional on a worker contact, U0K is the probability the worker is untrained
and unemployed and U1K is the probability the worker is trained and unemployed.
Vacancies meet unemployed workers at the rate m(✓)✓ . The capital gain from hiring
an untrained worker is JL0 (w) and from hiring a trained worker is JL1
 
wuL
 
.
Consider a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker.
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker from
unemployment is:
JL0 (w) =
yL   w
r + µ+  
(26)
The worker-firm match is dissolved if the job is destroyed by a shock  . yL   w
is the gain to the firm from hiring an untrained worker who produces yL and is
paid w.
Consider a low-technology firm hiring a trained worker.
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm employing a trained worker hired
from unemployment is:
JL1
 
wuL
 
=
yL   wuL
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
(27)
The worker-firm match is dissolved either if the worker changes her/his job, or
if the job is destroyed by a shock. yL  wuL is the gain to the firm from hiring a
worker who produces yL and is paid a wage wuL. With a probability  , the job is
destroyed by a shock. With a probability  m(✓) the worker meets another firm
(low or high-technology).
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14.2 High-Technology Firm
Consider a high-technology firm holding a vacancy. The expected payoﬀ to a
high-technology firm holding a vacancy is:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
U1
K
JH1
 
wuH
  
+

 E1L
K
JH1
 
wLH
   
(28)
The value to a high-technology firm holding a vacancy reflects the assumption
that only trained workers are able to perform these jobs. Conditional on a worker
contact, firms meet trained unemployed job seekers at a rate m(✓)✓
U1
K and trained
workers employed in a low-technology firm at a rate m(✓)✓
 E1L
K . The capital gain
from hiring a trained unemployed worker is
⇥
JH1
 
wuH
 ⇤
. Assuming surplus exists,
the capital gain from hiring a trained worker employed in a low-technology firm
is
⇥
JH1
 
wLH
 ⇤
.
Consider a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker. The expected payoﬀ to
a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from unemployment is:
JH1
 
wuH
 
=
yH   wuH
r + µ+  
(29)
yH   wuH is the gain to the firm from hiring a trained worker who produces yH
and is paid wuH . With a probability  , the job is destroyed.
The expected payoﬀ to a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from em-
ployment in a low-technology firm is:
JH1
 
wLH
 
=
yH   wLH
r + µ+  
(30)
The worker-firm match is dissolved if the job is destroyed by a shock. yH  wLH
is the gain to the firm from hiring a worker who produces yH and is paid a wage
wLH . With a probability  , the job is destroyed by a shock.
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14.3 Firm Equilibrium with Free Entry
Equations (25)  (30) can be reduced to two equations given by:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
U0
K

yL   w
r + µ+  
  
+

U1
K

yL   wuL
r + µ+   +  m (✓)
   
(31)
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
U1
K

yH   wuH
r + µ+  
  
+

 E1L
K

yH   wLH
r + µ+  
   
(32)
14.4 Steady State Conditions
This model analyses the market in a steady state, where workers maximize ex-
pected discounted income while firms maximize expected discounted profit. The
first steady state condition states that the outflow of untrained workers from
unemployment equals their inflow back into unemployment.
U0m (✓) ⇣ = ( 0   U0)   (33)
The flow of untrained workers out of unemployment is then ⇣ (the fraction of
low-technology vacancies) times U0 (the mass of unemployed untrained workers)
times m (✓) (the contact rate of workers). The flow into unemployment is then  
(the job destruction rate) times the mass of untrained employed workers. Since
total population is normalized to 1, the share of untrained employed workers is
then  0   U0 (proportion of untrained workers in the population minus those
within them who are unemployed).
Solving the above for U0 gives:
U0 =
  0
  +m (✓) ⇣
(34)
The second steady state condition states that the outflow of trained workers from
unemployment equals their inflow back into unemployment.
U1m (✓) = [(1   0)  U1]   (35)
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In equilibrium, the trained workers have a contact rate of m (✓) and the mass
of trained unemployed workers is U1. Thus, the outflow of trained unemployed
workers is given by m (✓)U1. There are 1    0 trained workers of whom U1 are
unemployed. Subtracting the later from former times the job destruction rate
gives us the inflow of trained workers into unemployment.
Solving for U1 gives:
U1 =
 (1   0)
  +m (✓)
(36)
The third steady-state condition states that the outflow of trained workers em-
ployed in low-technology firm from unemployment equals their inflow back into
unemployment.
[  +  m (✓) (1  ⇣)]E1L = U1m (✓) ⇣ (37)
The inflow of trained workers employed in a low-technology firm into employment
is given by U1m (✓) ⇣. There are U1 trained unemployed people. With an arrival
rate of m (✓) ⇣, they meet a firm with a low-technology.
The outflow of trained workers employed in low-technology firms from employ-
ment happens when either the job is destroyed by a shock or there is worker
turnover through on-the-job search. There are E1L trained workers employed
in low-technology firms. The probability of of meeting a high-technology job is
 m (✓) (1  ⇣), and the job is destroyed at an exogenous rate,  .
Solving the above gives:
E1L =
m (✓) ⇣ (1   0)
[  +m (✓)] [  +  m (✓) (1  ⇣)] (38)
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14.5 Equilibrium
A steady-state equilibrium with on-the-job search consists of the wage w given by
(13) and a set of value functions for V u1 and V
j
1 (w
ij) that satisfy (19-24) plus a
vector [✓, ⇣, U0, U1, E1L] such that:
1. All matches produce a non-negative surplus for the equilibrium values of
{✓, ⇣}.
2. The vector [✓, ⇣, U0, U1, E1L] solves the steady state conditions (34), (36) and
(38) plus the free entry conditions (31) and (32).
14.6 Numerical Solution
In this section some results of numerical simlutaions are illustrated. Following
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Dolado, Jansen & Jimeno (2009), a stand-
ard Cobb-Douglas meeting function with a constant elasticity of 0.5 is assumed,
i.e. m (✓) = A
p
✓, with A assumed to be equal to one. Time is measured in
months. The parameter values are similar to Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and
Dolado, Jansen & Jimeno (2009). Particularly, r = 0.01, µ = 0.05,   = 0.05,
b = 0.1,  0 = 2/3, c = 0.5,   = 0.7, yH = 1.5 and a normalised value yL = 1. The
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baseline parameter values are chosen with three criteria in mind. First, the para-
meter values should be realistic. For example, Blanchard and Diamond, (1989)
using labour market data from the US from 1968-1981 show that the returns to
scale are close to one. Davis and Haltiwanger, (1990) using data from the U. S.
manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1986 find that the quarterly job destruction
rate is about 5.62%. Hall (2006) uses data from the US labour market and estim-
ates the job finding rate to be around 40% per month while Brainerd and Perry
(2002) estimate the US quarterly job finding rate to be around 70% for the first
year of search. Second, the values of the endogenous variables that result from
these parameter values must also be realistic. For example, the in the baseline
model the parameters used result in an unemployment duration of 3 months.
Finally, the baseline parameters must be such that likely variations show the
diﬀerent equilibrium and comparative statics possibilities. The first row shows
the results when the bargaining power of worker  , is assumed to be equal to 0.5
and for comparison the second row shows the results when   is assumed to be 0.
✓ ⇣ U0 U1 E0 E1 E1L w wuL wuH wLH wLL
  = 0.5 14.04 0.72 0.01 0.004 0.65 0.33 0.015 0.55 0.49 1.42 1.00 1.00
  = 0 66.4 0.79 0.005 0.002 0.66 0.33 0.010 0.10 -46.57 0.10 1.00 1.00
Table 1
For the chosen parameters a unique cross-skill matching equilibrium is obtained
each time. The most striking feature of this model is that most of the vacancies
are low technology. The reasons for this are that (i) most workers are low-skill
( 0 = 2/3) and (ii) high technology jobs are only 50% more productive than
low technology jobs. Since there are fewer high technology vacancies, the rate
at which trained workers find jobs is only slightly above the corresponding rate
for untrained workers. At the equilibrium value of ✓, an untrained worker exits
unemployment at a rate ⇣m (✓) = 2.69 while a trained worker does so at a rate
m (✓) = 3.75. Unemployment in the model is low. The fraction of untrained
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unemployed workers among all the unemployed workers is 0.73 while that of
trained unemployed workers is 0.27. This implies that trained workers, when
they are employed, are typically working at high-technology firms.
The equilibrium value of ✓ = 14.04 implies a steady-state measure of vacancies
of V = 0.38 . The average duration of unemployment is slightly more than 3
months (12 x 1p
14.0381
) = 3.20), while the average duration of a vacancy is close
to 45 months (12 x ( 14.0381p
14.0381
) = 44.96).
When employed in a low technology firm, untrained workers receive a wage that
is a weighted average of their flow value of unemployment and the flow value of
their productivity.
Trained workers have four diﬀerent wages. Trained workers who are hired by a
low-technology firm from unemployment receive a wage that is lower than the
wage received by untrained workers hired by the same firm from unemployment.
This is because these workers accept a wage cut since they have the option of
raising their wage through on-the-job search. Trained workers who are hired by
a high-technology firm from unemployment receive a wage that is a weighted
average of the flow value of unemployment and the marginal productivity of
the worker in a high-technology firm. There is one wage for a trained worker
employed in a low-technology firm who indulges in on-the-job search. If this
worker meets another low-technology firm, Bertrand competition between the
two firms forces both firms to pay a wage equal to the marginal productivity of
the worker in the low-technology firm and the worker stays in her/his current
job. If the worker instead meets a high-technology firm, the worker moves jobs
and is paid the same wage, that is, a wage equal to the marginal productivity of
a trained worker in a low-technology firm (second price auction price).
When   = 0, the firms have all the bargaining power. The first diﬀerence to
highlight when comparing the results when   = 0 compared to when   = 0.5 is
that ✓, the labour market tightness is much higher. The second striking diﬀerence
is that the proportion of high-technology jobs, (1  ⇣), is 24.8% lower when
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firms have all the bargaining power (21.23%), compared to the case where the
workers and firms have equal bargaining power (28.24%). This is because the
low technology firms gain a lot of profit from a match with trained workers when
  = 0. Consequently, with equal bargaining power untrained workers constitute
73.49% of the total unemployed while when firms have all the bargaining power
untrained workers constitute 72.22% of the total unemployed.
The second diﬀerence worth stressing is that the share of mismatched workers
among the trained employed workers is lower with   = 0 (3.11%) than with
  = 0.5 (4.53%). This is because the arrival rate of job oﬀers is higher when
  = 0. When   = 0, at the equilibrium value of ✓, an untrained worker exits
unemployment at a rate ⇣m (✓) = 6.42 while a trained worker does so at a rate
m (✓) = 8.15.
When   = 0.5 and a low-technology firm hires an untrained worker from un-
employment, the wage it oﬀers is equal to the weighted average of the worker’s
outside option, that is the flow value of unemployment, and the marginal pro-
ductivity in the low-technology firm. However, when the firm has all the bargain-
ing power, this worker receives a wage equal to the flow value of unemployment.
Similarly, when   = 0, and a trained worker is hired from unemployment by
a high-technology firm, the worker receives a wage equal to the flow value of
unemployment. However, if the trained worker is hired by a low-technology firm
from unemployment, the worker accepts a large cut in wage below the flow value
of unemployment. Accepting this wage cut is worthwhile because the worker has
the option of on-the-job search to move to a high technology firm or to stay in
the same job and receive a pay rise. Thus, the low technology firm extracts as
much of the surplus it can while employing a trained worker from unemployment.
When such a worker indulges in on-the-job search, she/he is able to raise her/his
wage equal to her/his marginal productivity in the low-technology firm regardless
of which type of firm it meets.
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14.6.1 Comparing with DJJ
In order to compare the results of this model with that of Dolado, Jansen and
Jimeno (2008), I now use the parameter specifications used by Dolado, et al.
Time is in quarters and the parameters are given by: r = 0.01, c = 0.5,   = 0.1,
µ = 0, b = 0.1,  0 = 0.75,   = 1,   = 0.5, yH = 1.5 and a normalised value
yL = 1. The first row of the results show the results of my model with Dolado et
al, parameters and the second row shows the results of the Dolado model taken
from their paper.
✓ ⇣ U0 U1 E0 E1 E1L w wuL wuH wLH wLL
DJJ parameters 15.08 0.79 0.02 0.006 0.73 0.24 0.021 0.55 0.12 1.42 1.00 1.00
DJJ Results 1.49 0.67 0.08 0.02 0.67 0.23 0.031 0.90 0.75 1.31 - -
Table 2
For the chosen parameters a unique cross-skill matching equilibrium is obtained.
The most striking result is that ✓, the labour market tightness is much higher
in this model compared to DJJ results and fewer high-technology vacancies are
available in this model compared to DJJ. This is because firms oﬀering high-
technology vacancies gain less because they pay a large part of the output gen-
erated to the workers in form of wages under Bertrand Competition with other
firms compared to a linear surplus splitting rule. With a sequential auction the
firm is able to extract all the match rents ex-ante. With bargaining this is not
so anymore. This model yields a higher share of untrained workers amongst all
the unemployed workers (0.940) compared to DJJ (0.806). In order to determ-
ine wages, Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2008) impose the assumption of a linear
surplus-splitting rule between the workers and firms. This reduces the arrival
rate of jobs substantially when compared to wage determination through Ber-
trand Competition. Under Bertrand Competition workers indulge in on-the-job
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search in pursuit of a wage increase, which reduces the overall unemployment in
the market and also reduces the mismatch.
At the equilibrium value of ✓, an untrained worker exits unemployment at a
rate ⇣m (✓) = 3.06 (0.82 for DJJ) while trained workers do so at a rate m (✓) =
3.88 (1.21 for DJJ). The second diﬀerence worth stressing is that the share of
mismatched workers among the trained workers is lower under this model (8.49%)
than the DJJ results (13.45%).
Under the linear-surplus splitting rule the wages determined through Nash bar-
gaining are such that for all types of workers the wages are between their value
of unemployment and the value of their productivity. However, with Bertrand
Competition there are several wages a mismatched worker can get. One of these
wages (paid to workers hired from unemployment) is lower than the wage received
by untrained workers (when hired from unemployment). When hired from em-
ployment trained workers receive a wage equal to their marginal productivity in
a low-technology firm. Trained workers hired by high-technology firm hired from
unemployment receive a wage equal to the weighted average of their flow value
of unemployment and their marginal productivity in the high-technology firm.
14.6.2 Comparative Statics
Table 3 shows the comparative static eﬀect of changing variables one at a time.
The first row is the same as the first row of table 1 replicated here for convenience.
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✓ ⇣ U0 U1 E0 E1 E1L w wuL wuH wLH wLL
baseline 14.04 0.72 0.012 0.0044 0.654 0.329 0.015 0.55 0.49 1.42 1.00 1.00
b = 0.2 12.26 0.70 0.013 0.0047 0.653 0.329 0.014 0.60 0.56 1.42 1.00 1.00
c = 0.3 38.07 0.72 0.007 0.0027 0.659 0.331 0.009 0.55 0.50 1.45 1.00 1.00
  = 0.025 22.97 0.71 0.004 0.0017 0.662 0.332 0.006 0.55 0.50 1.45 1.00 1.00
 0 = 0.75 15.15 0.78 0.012 0.0032 0.738 0.247 0.015 0.55 0.49 1.41 1.00 1.00
yH = 1.2 5.60 0.86 0.016 0.0069 0.651 0.326 0.049 0.55 0.42 1.11 1.00 1.00
Table 3
Compared to the benchmark economy when the flow value of unemployment, b,
is increased from 0.1 to 0.2, the labour market tightness is reduced by about
12.6%. The proportion of high-technology vacancies increases by 6.98%. The
fraction of untrained unemployed amongst all the unemployed stays almost the
same. The proportion of mismatched workers among the trained workers also
remains almost the same. The duration of unemployment increases slightly to
3.43 months. This is because with an increase in the flow value of unemployment
workers can aﬀord to stay longer in unemployment. The gain from on-the-job
search is lower compared to when b = 0.1.
When the cost of vacancy, c, is decreased from 0.5 to 0.3, the labour market tight-
ness increases by 171%. The proportion of high-technology vacancies remains al-
most the same. The share of untrained unemployed among the unemployed stays
almost the same. The proportion of mismatched workers among trained workers
decreases by 37.9%. The duration of unemployment reduces to 2 months. Total
vacancies increase to 0.64 and the duration of vacancy increases to 74 months.
Lowering the cost of vacancy means that firms are able to hold vacancies for
longer. It also favours the workers by reducing the duration of unemployment.
When the job destruction rate,  , is decreased from 0.0.5 to 0.025, the labour
market tightness increases by 62%. The proportion of high-technology vacan-
cies remains almost the same. The share of untrained unemployed among the
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unemployed does not change. The proportion of mismatched workers among
trained workers decreases by 60%. The duration of unemployment is reduced to
2.5 months while the duration of a vacancy increases to 57.5 months. With a
lower job destruction rate the overall unemployment is reduced since fewer people
enter unemployment due to an exogenous shock. Subsequently, the duration of
unemployment is also lower.
When the share of untrained workers,  0, is increased from 2/3 to 0.75, the labour
market tightness increases by 7.9%. The proportion of high-technology vacancies
decreases by 23% and the fraction of untrained unemployed among the unem-
ployed increases by 8.34%. The proportion of mismatched workers among the
trained increased by 25.5%. With a smaller share of trained workers, the market
starts oﬀering more low-technology jobs. Hence, mismatch in the economy is also
increased. This could be the diﬀerence between a more developed country and a
less developed country with the later having more untrained workers.
Compared to the benchmark economy when the output gap between the un-
trained and trained workers is decreased from 0.5 to 0.2, the labour market
tightness is decreased by 60%. The proportion of high-technology vacancies de-
creases by 50% and the fraction of untrained unemployed among the unemployed
decreases by 4.29%. The proportion of mismatched workers among the trained
workers increases by 232%. When trained workers are employed, more of them
are working at low-technology firms. This is because the diﬀerence in productiv-
ity and hence the wages in a high-technology firm is not as substantial compared
to in a low-technology firm. Since the gain from employing trained workers is re-
duced the number of high-technology vacancies also decline. Consequently, since
high-technology jobs are rare, mismatch in the economy increases.
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14.6.3 Wage Dispersion
To quantify the eﬀect of these job-to-job transitions on wage dispersion, four
useful statistics are reported. As a proxy for the degree of between group wage
inequality, the ratio between the average wage of trained workers and the wage
of untrained workers is calculated. Likewise, the within group wage inequality is
measured by the ratio between the average wage of trained workers and their wage
in a low technology job. Finally, to control for the relative size of the two groups,
the total variance of the wage distribution, which is further decomposed into a
permanent component due to between group wage diﬀerences and a transitory
component due to within group wage diﬀerences is also computed. Table 4 shows
the results obtained.
Between
Group
Variation
Within
Group
Variation
Between
Group
Variance
Within
Group
Variance
baseline 1.78 1.31 0.09 0.03
b = 0.2 1.66 1.27 0.08 0.02
c = 0.3 1.80 1.31 0.10 0.03
  = 0.025 1.80 1.31 0.10 0.03
 0 = 0.75 1.77 1.31 0.09 0.03
yH = 1.2 1.60 1.25 0.05 0.01
Table 4
Compared to the benchmark economy, when the flow value of unemployment is
increased both the between-group and within group wage dispersion is reduced.
A decrease in the cost of vacancy increases the between-group wage dispersion but
the within-group wage dispersion remains the same. Thus, when a worker gains
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from an additional payment during unemployment the wage dispersion between
the workers is reduced, however, when a firm receives the additional payment
that reduces the cost of holding a vacancy, the wage dispersion is increased.
When the job destruction rate   is reduced the between group wage dispersion
is increased but the within group wage dispersion remains the same. Thus,
a slower death rate of firms increases the wage dispersion among the workers.
When the fraction of untrained workers among all the workers is increased the
wage dispersion does not change significantly. This may be because the change
in the fraction of untrained workers is not substantial.
Decreasing the output gap between the two types of workers substantially reduces
both the between-group and within-group wage dispersion among the workers.
When the two types of workers are almost equally productive, the average wages
they receive are also similar. Hence, the wage dispersion among such workers is
reduced significantly.
14.6.4 USA vs Europe
In this section the model is adapted to reflect the job markets in the US and in
Europe. This is to compare markets with diﬀerent levels of reallocations. In both
markets job-to-job transitions explain between 40% and 50% of the separations.
Also the unemployment rate is higher in Europe, however, wage inequality is
higher in the US. Following Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2008), the parameter
choice in the benchmark model is modified to reflect these facts. To capture the
lower unemployment and higher wage inequality in the US, a higher matching
eﬃciency is assumed for the US labour market than the European one. Thus,
the meeting function is now m(✓) = A√✓, with A = 1.25 for US and A = 1 for
Europe. In the current model, this change leads to lower unemployment rates for
both types of workers and a higher in wage dispersion. However, this would lead
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to a fall in the share of mismatched workers, which would decline the job-to-job
separations of highly educated workers. Hence, another parameter   is changed
such that the higher flexibility in the US market also means a higher value of  
there. Thus, for the US labour market   = 1, whereas for the European labour
market   = 0.5. Table 5 shows the results of such simulations.
✓ ⇣ U0 U1 E0 E1 E1L w wuL wuH wLH wLL
US 13.85 0.716 0.0099 0.003 0.657 0.3298 0.009 0.55 0.12 1.44 1.00 1.00
Europe 14.06 0.719 0.0121 0.004 0.654 0.3289 0.020 0.55 0.73 1.41 1.00 1.00
Table 5
The results show that in the first row there is a greater wage dispersion, which
is synonymous to the case of the US, and the second row shows a higher unem-
ployment rate and a lower matching eﬃciency synonymous to Europe.
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15 Everyone Searches On-the-Job
In this section the assumption imposed earlier of only allowing mismatched work-
ers to search is relaxed to give more realism to the model. As explained earlier,
this is important because workers not only search for jobs while employed in
pursuit of a better match but also indulge in on-the-job search to get a pay raise.
In a market with frictions when more people search for jobs when employed, the
mismatch is more and the wage inequality between the two types of workers is
more.
15.1 Matching
Let U0 be the measure of unemployed workers who are untrained and U1 the
measure of unemployed workers who are trained. Let E0 be the measure of
employed workers who are untrained and E1 the measure of employed workers
who are trained. Let E1L denote the measure of trained workers who are employed
in a low-technology firm.
Unemployed workers and vacancies are assumed to meet each other according to
a random matching technology, where M = M(K,V ) denotes the flow number
of contacts.
K =  0(U0+U1)+ 1(E0+E1), is the aggregate job search eﬀort and V = VL+VH ,
is the total vacancies. Assuming constant returns, define labour market tightness
✓ = V/K and m(✓) = M(K,V )K = M(1, ✓) which describes the arrival rate of job
oﬀers per unit eﬀort.
I assume that m0(✓) > 0 and that lim✓!1m0(✓) = 0.
Unemployed workers sample job oﬀers randomly at Poisson rate  0m(✓). Em-
ployees may also search for a better job while employed and the arrival rate of
oﬀers to on-the-job searchers is  1m(✓).  0 and  1 are exogenous. I assume
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 0 >  1.
Similarly, vacancies meet unemployed workers at rate m(✓)✓ . I assume this rate is
decreasing in ✓ and that lim✓!0[m(✓)/✓] =1.
15.2 Equilibrium Wage Bargaining
15.2.1 Untrained workers e = 0
Since, the flow payoﬀ during unemployment b > 0, an untrained worker has
no gains to trade with a high-technology firm. This is because these workers
receive b > 0 during unemployment while the maximum they can receive in the
high-technology firm is their productivity which is 0.
When the worker is paid her/his marginal productivity, the employer makes zero
marginal profit on this worker, who therefore receives the entire match value
V L0
 
yL
 
. Further assuming that a vacant job has zero value to the employer, the
diﬀerence between the match value V L0
 
yL
 
and the unemployment value defines
the match surplus:
⇥
V L0
 
yL
   V u0 ⇤.
When an unemployed worker is matched with a low-technology firm, she/he
obtains her/his reservation utility, V u0 , plus a share   of the maximum match
surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity yL
in the low-technology firm. Let w be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a
contact between an untrained, unemployed worker and a low technology firm.
Equilibrium bargaining implies w solves:
V L0 (w) = V
u
0 +  
⇥
V L0
 
yL
   V u0 ⇤ (39)
When an untrained employed worker receives an outside job oﬀer, a three-player
bargaining process is started between the worker, her/his initial employer, and
the employer who made the outside oﬀer. No employer will pay more than match
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productivity. The auction forces a low-technology firm to place a bid equal to
marginal productivity, yL, of the worker in that job.
Let w¯ be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between an untrained,
employed worker and two low-technology firms. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
w¯ = yL (40)
15.2.2 Bargaining with trained workers
Again I start by considering an unemployed trained worker. Suppose the worker
contacts a low-technology firm. The negotiated wage, denoted wuL, solves:
V L1 (w
uL) = V u1 +  
⇥
V L1
 
yL
   V u1 ⇤ (41)
When a trained, unemployed worker is matched with a low-technology firm,
she/he obtains her/his reservation utility, V u1 , plus a share   of the maximum
match surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity
yL in the low-technology firm. Since,  1 <  0, the worker only accepts the wage
oﬀer if V L1
 
yL
 
> V u1 , otherwise she/he prefers to stay unemployed.
When an unemployed worker is matched with a high-technology firm, she/he
obtains her/his reservation utility, V u1 , plus a share   of the maximum match
surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity yH
in the high-technology firm.
Let wuH be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained,
unemployed worker and a high technology firm. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
V H1 (w
uH) = V u1 +  
⇥
V H1
 
yH
   V u1 ⇤ (42)
When a trained worker employed in a low-technology firm receives an outside
job oﬀer from another low-technology firm, a three-player bargaining process
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is started between the worker, her/his initial employer, and the employer who
made the outside oﬀer. No employer will pay more than match productivity. The
auction forces a low-technology firm to place a bid equal to marginal productivity,
yL, of the worker in that job. The worker stays in her/his current job but her/his
wage is raised to the marginal productivity in the low-technology firm.
Let wLL be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained,
worker employed in a low-technology firm meeting another low-technology firm
with a Bertrand Competition. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
wLL = yL (43)
When a trained employed worker employed in a high-technology firm receives
an outside job oﬀer from another high-technology firm, a three-player bargaining
process is started between the worker, her/his initial employer, and the employer
who made the outside oﬀer. No employer will pay more than match productivity.
The auction forces a high-technology firm to place a bid equal to marginal pro-
ductivity, yH , of the worker in that job. The worker stays in her/his current job
but her/his wage is raised to the marginal productivity in the high-technology
firm.
Let wHH be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained
worker employed in a high-technology firm who meets another high-technology
firm. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
wHH = yH (44)
Lemma 3
When a type-e = 1 employee in a j = L firm receives an outside oﬀer from a
j = H firm, the worker moves to the j = H firm, where she/he gets wage wLH
that solves:
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V H1 (w
LH) = V L1 (y
L) +  
⇥
V H1
 
yH
   V L1 (yL)⇤ (45)
Proof
yH is the highest wage in the market. It is always better to earn this wage than
any other wage. Thus, V H1 (yH) > V L1 (yL). The highest wage a low-technology
firm can oﬀer is yL which the worker values at V L1
 
yL
 
. The employee receives a
positive surplus on top of this outside option from moving and hence prefers to
move from a j = L firm to a j = H firm. Q.E.D.
Note that the wage wLH obtained in the new firm can be smaller than the wage
paid in the previous job, because the worker expects larger wage rises in firms
with higher productivity. This option value eﬀect implies that workers may be
willing to take wage cuts just to move from a low- to a high-technology firm.
This section determines W =
⇥
w, w¯, wuL, wuH , wLH , wLL, wHH
⇤
as a function of
V ue and V je (w). The next step is to determine V ue and V je (w) consistent with
W (e).
15.3 Worker’s Problem
15.4 Untrained Worker e = 0
Let ⇣ = VLVL+VH denote the fraction of vacancies which are oﬀered by low-technology
firms. As untrained workers have no gains to trade with high-technology firms,
their eﬀective arrival rate of job oﬀers is  0⇣m(✓) during unemployment and
 1⇣m(✓) during employment.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 0 when unem-
ployed is:
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(r + µ)V u0 = b+  0m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L0 (w)  V u0
⇤
(46)
The value of unemployment for an untrained worker incorporates the assumption
that an untrained worker is not productive in a high-technology job. The gains
from trade from the job are
⇥
V L0 (w)  V u0
⇤
. The flow payoﬀ from unemployment
is b.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 0 hired from
unemployment is:
(r + µ)V L0 (w) = w +  
⇥
V u0   V L0 (w)
⇤
+ 1m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L0 (w¯)  V L0 (w)
⇤
(47)
The flow value of an untrained worker hired from unemployment equals the sum of
the flow return, w, plus the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u0   V L0 (w)
⇤
from the job breaking and the capital gain from on-the-job search. An untrained
worker meets a low-technology firm at the rate  1m (✓) ⇣. Both firms will oﬀer a
single wage w¯ > w. Assuming that it is costly to move the worker stays with the
current employer but is able to make capital gains of
⇥
V L0 (w¯)  V L0 (w)
⇤
.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 0 hired from
employment is:
(r + µ)V L0 (w¯) = y
L +  
⇥
V u0   V L0 (w¯)
⇤
(48)
The flow value of an untrained worker hired from employment equals the sum of
the flow return, w¯ = yL, plus the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u0   V L0 (w¯)
⇤
from the job breaking. There are no capital gains from on-the-job search.
Note the 3 equations (46-48) which determine V u0 , V L0 (yL) and V L0 (w). As equa-
tion (39) determined w there are 4 equations for 4 unknowns.
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Lemma 4
For an e = 0 worker, wage w, w¯ and corresponding value functions V u0 and
V j0 (w
ij) for i = uL,H and j = L,H a solution exists and is bound for all
⇣ 2 [0, 1] and ✓   0. Equilibrium wage bargaining implies:
V u0 =
1
r + µ
⇢
b

r + µ+  
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
 
+

 0m(✓)⇣ yL
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
  
2 [ b
r + µ
,
yL
r + µ
] (49)
V L0 (y
L) =
1
r + µ
⇢
b

 
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
 
+

r + µ+  0m(✓)⇣ yL
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
  
2 [ b
r + µ
,
yL
r + µ
] (50)
V L0 (w) =
1
r + µ
⇢
b

(r + µ) (1   ) +  
r + µ+   +  0m (✓) ⇣ 
 
+

[(r + µ)   +  0m(✓)⇣ ] yL
r + µ+   +  0m (✓) ⇣ 
  
2 [ b
r + µ
,
yL
r + µ
] (51)
w¯ = yL (52)
w = b  yL (1  b)

 1m (✓) ⇣ (1   )
r + µ+  
 
< b (53)
Note the wage w < b, the flow pay-oﬀ from leisure. Hence workers are willing to
take wage cuts because they expect a larger wage rises through on-the-job search.
15.5 Trained Worker e = 1
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 when unem-
ployed is:
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(r + µ)V u1 = b+  0m (✓) {⇣[V L1 (wuL)  V u1 ] + (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
wuH
   V u1 ⇤} (54)
The value of unemployment for a trained worker incorporates the assumption that
these workers are productive in both low and high technologies. An unemployed
trained worker meets a low-technology firm at an arrival rate of  0m (✓) ⇣ and a
high-technology firm at an arrival rate of  0m (✓) (1  ⇣). The gains from trade
with a high-technology firm are [V H1 (wuH)   V u1 ]. Assuming surplus exists the
gains from trade with a low-technology firm are [V L1 (wuL) V u1 ] . The flow payoﬀ
from unemployment is b.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 employed in
a j = L firm hired from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V L1
 
wuL
 
= wuL +  
⇥
V u1   V L1
 
wuL
 ⇤
+ 1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
wLH
   V L1  wuL ⇤
+ 1m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L1
 
yL
   V L1  wuL ⇤ (55)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in low-technology
firm hired from unemployment equals the sum of the flow return, wuL, plus
the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1   V L1
 
wuL
 ⇤
from the job break-
ing up and the capital gains from on-the-job search. With an arrival rate of
 1m (✓) (1  ⇣), the worker meets a high-technology firm and gains [V H1
 
wLH
  
V L1
 
wuL
 
]. With an arrival rate of  1m (✓) ⇣ the worker meets a low-technology
firm. Assuming moving is costly, the worker stays with the current employer but
is able to bargain her/his wage to wLL = yL, where yL > wuL. The gain to the
worker in this case is
⇥
V L1
 
yL
   V L1  wuL ⇤.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 employed in
a j = L firm hired from employment is:
(r + µ)V L1
 
wLL
 
= yL +  
⇥
V u1   V L1
 
wLL
 ⇤
+ 1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
wLH
   V L1  wLL ⇤ (56)
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The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in a low-technology
firm hired from employment equals the sum of the flow return, wLL = yL, plus
the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1   V L1
 
wLL
 ⇤
from the job break-
ing up and the capital gains from on-the-job search. With an arrival rate of
 1m (✓) (1  ⇣), the worker meets a high-technology firm and gains
⇥
V H1
 
wLH
   V L1  wLL ⇤.
There are no gains from trade if this worker meets another low-technology firm.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 employed in
a j = H firm hired from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V H1
 
wuH
 
= wuH +  
⇥
V u1   V H1
 
wuH
 ⇤
+ 1m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L1
 
yL
   V H1  wuH ⇤
+ 1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
wHH
   V H1  wuH ⇤ (57)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in a high-technology
firm hired from unemployment equals the sum of the flow return, wuH , plus the
expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1   V H1
 
wuH
 ⇤
from the job breaking up
and the capital gains from on-the-job search. With an arrival rate of  1m (✓) ⇣,
the worker meets a low-technology firm. Assuming surplus exists the worker
gains [V L1
 
yL
    V H1  wuH ] . The worker meets a high-technology firm at an
arrival rate  1m (✓) (1 ⇣). The worker’s current employer and the new employer
enter a bid for the worker’s services. Assuming moving is costly, the worker stays
with the current employer but is able to bargain her/his wage to wHH = yH ,
where yH > wuH . The capital gains are
⇥
V H1
 
wHH
   V H1  wuH ⇤.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a worker with e = 1 employed in
a j = H firm hired from employment is:
(r + µ)V H1
 
wHH
 
= wHH +  
⇥
V u1   V H1
 
wHH
 ⇤
(58)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in a high-technology
firm hired from employment equals the sum of the flow return, wHH , plus the
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expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1   V H1
 
wHH
 ⇤
from the job breaking.
There are no capital gains from on-the-job search.
Note the 5 equations (54-58) which determine V u1 and V
j
1 (w
ij). As equations
(41-42) and (45) determined wuL, wuH and wLH there are 8 equations for 8
unknowns.
Lemma 5
For an e = 1 worker with wage wij and corresponding value functions V u1 and
V j1 (w
ij) for i = u, L,H and j = L,H a solution exists and is bound for all
⇣ 2 [0, 1] and ✓   0.
Proof
Equilibrium wage bargaining implies:
V H1 (y
H) =
yH +  V u1
r + µ+  
2 ⇥b, yH⇤ (59)
V L1 (y
L) =
yL +  V u1 +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)V H1
 
wLH
 
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣) 2
⇥
b, yH
⇤
(60)
V H1 (w
LH) = (1   )V L1
 
yL
 
+  V H1 (y
H) 2 ⇥b, yH⇤ (61)
V H1 (w
uH) = (1   )V u1 +  V H1 (yH) 2
⇥
b, yH
⇤
(62)
V L1 (w
uL) = (1   )V u1 +  V L1 (yL) 2
⇥
b, yH
⇤
(63)
V u1 =
b+   0m(✓)
⇥
⇣V L1 (y
L) + (1  ⇣)V H1 (yH)
⇤
r + µ+  0m (✓)  
2 ⇥b, yH⇤ (64)
Each value function is continuous. Further, each value function is a function of
another value function multiplied by a discount factor < 1. Also, each value
86
function is bounded between
⇥
b, yH
⇤
. By Brouwer fixed-point theorem, there
exists at least one continuously diﬀerentiable solution on
⇥
b, yH
⇤
.
15.6 Firm’s Problem With Free Entry
Let J je (w) denote the expected lifetime value of a firm of type j✏{L,H} employing
a worker with training e 2 (0, 1), paying wage w. There is free entry of firms into
each technology sector. Free entry implies new firms in each sector make zero
expected profit. The value to the firm of a vacancy is zero.
15.7 Low-Technology Firm
Consider a low-technology firm holding a vacancy. Trained workers find it worth-
while to accept these jobs.
The expected payoﬀ of a low-technology firm holding a vacancy is:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
 0U0
K
[JL0 (w)]
 
+
 0U1
K
⇥
JL1
 
wuL
 ⇤ 
(65)
Conditional on a worker contact,  0U0K is the probability the worker is untrained
and unemployed and  0U1K is the probability the worker is trained and unemployed.
Vacancies meet unemployed workers at the rate m(✓)✓ . The capital gain from hiring
an untrained worker is JL0 (w) and from hiring a trained worker is JL1
 
wuL
 
.
Consider a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker. There is no gain to
the firm from hiring a worker from employment.
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker from
employment is:
JL0 (w) = 0 (66)
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The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker from
unemployment is:
JL0 (w) =
yL   w
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) ⇣
(67)
The worker-firm match is dissolved if the job is destroyed by a shock  , or if
the worker changes her/his job.  1m (✓) ⇣ is the probability the worker meets a
low-technology firm and changes her/his job. yL w is the gain to the firm from
hiring an untrained worker who produces yL and is paid w.
Consider a low-technology firm hiring a trained worker. There is no gain to the
firm from hiring a worker from employment.
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm employing a trained worker from
employment is:
JL1
 
wLL
 
= 0 (68)
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm employing a trained worker hired
from unemployment is:
JL1
 
wuL
 
=
yL   wuL
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
(69)
The worker-firm match is dissolved either if the worker changes her/his job, or
if the job is destroyed by a shock. yL  wuL is the gain to the firm from hiring a
worker who produces yL and is paid a wage wuL. With a probability  , the job is
destroyed by a shock. With a probability  1m(✓) the worker meets another firm
(low or high-technology).
15.8 High-Technology Firm
Consider a high-technology firm holding a vacancy. The expected payoﬀ to a
high-technology firm holding a vacancy is:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
 0U1
K
⇥
JH1
 
wuH
 ⇤
+
 1E1L
K
⇥
JH1
 
wLH
 ⇤ 
(70)
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The value to a high-technology firm holding a vacancy reflects the assumption
that only trained workers are able to perform these jobs. Conditional on a worker
contact, firms meet trained unemployed job seekers at a rate m(✓)✓
 0U1
K and trained
workers employed in a low-technology firm at a rate m(✓)✓
 1E1L
K . The capital gain
from hiring a trained unemployed worker is
⇥
JH1
 
wuH
 ⇤
. Assuming surplus exists,
the capital gain from hiring a trained worker employed in a low-technology firm
is
⇥
JH1
 
wLH
 ⇤
.
Consider a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker. There is no gain to the
firm from hiring a worker from employment.
The expected payoﬀ to a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from em-
ployment in a high-technology firm is:
JH1
 
wHH
 
= 0 (71)
The expected payoﬀ to a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from un-
employment is:
JH1
 
wuH
 
=
yH   wuH
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣) (72)
yH   wuH is the gain to the firm from hiring a trained worker who produces yH
and is paid wuH . With a probability  , the job is destroyed. With a probability
 1m (✓) (1  ⇣), the worker meets a high-technology firm.
The expected payoﬀ to a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from em-
ployment in a low-technology firm is:
JH1
 
wLH
 
=
yH   wLH
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
(73)
The worker-firm match is dissolved either if the worker changes her/his job, or if
the job is destroyed by a shock. yH   wLH is the gain to the firm from hiring a
worker who produces yH and is paid a wage wLH . With a probability  , the job
is destroyed by a shock. With a probability  1m(✓) the worker meets another
firm (low or high-technology).
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15.9 Firm Equilibrium with Free Entry
Equations (65)  (73) can be reduced to two equations given by:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
 0U0
K

yL   w
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) ⇣
 
+
 0U1
K

yL   wuL
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
  
(74)
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
 0U1
K

yH   wuH
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
 
+
 1E1L
K

yH   wLH
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
  
(75)
15.10 Equilibrium
A steady-state equilibrium with on-the-job search consists of the wage w given by
(53) and a set of value functions for V u1 and V
j
1 (w
ij) that satisfy (59-64) plus a
vector [✓, ⇣, U0, U1, E1L] such that:
1. All matches produce a non-negative surplus for the equilibrium values of
{✓, ⇣}.
2. The vector [✓, ⇣, U0, U1, E1L] solves the steady state conditions (34), (36) and
(38) plus the free entry conditions (74) and (75).
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15.11 Numerical Solutions
In this section some results of numerical simulations are illustrated. As before
a standard Cobb-Douglas meeting function with a constant elasticity of 0.5 is
assumed, i.e. m (✓) = A
p
✓, with A assumed to be equal to one and time is
measured in quarters. The parameters are kept the same as before for compar-
ison. Particularly, r = 0.01, µ = 0.05,   = 0.05, c = 0.5, b = 0.1,  0 = 2/3,
 1 = 0.5,  0 = 0.7, yH = 1.5 and a normalised value yL = 1. Table 6 shows
the results of the baseline model in equilibrium as well as the comparative static
results from changing diﬀerent parameters.
✓ ⇣ U0 U1 E0 E1 E1L w w wuL wuH wLH wLL wHH
Baseline 0.98 0.64 0.067 0.022 0.60 0.31 0.044 -1.20 1.00 0.46 1.00 -4.87 1.00 1.50
b = 0.2 0.89 0.63 0.072 0.023 0.59 0.31 0.04 -0.88 1.00 0.53 1.04 -4.49 1.00 1.50
c = 0.3 1.66 0.62 0.055 0.017 0.61 0.32 0.03 -1.53 1.00 0.47 1.01 -6.83 1.00 1.50
  = 0.025 0.64 0.66 0.042 0.014 0.62 0.32 0.03 -1.30 1.00 0.46 1.03 -4.01 1.00 1.50
 0 = 0.75 0.98 0.71 0.069 0.017 0.68 0.23 0.04 -1.33 1.00 0.46 1.07 -5.33 1.00 1.50
yH = 1.2 0.95 0.66 0.07 0.020 0.60 0.31 0.05 -1.23 1.00 0.43 0.65 -4.29 1.00 1.20
Table 6
For the chosen parameters a unique equilibrium is obtained each time. The first
row of Table 6 shows the labour market results for the benchmark economy. Com-
paring the results to when only mismatched workers search in the market, when
all workers search, ✓, the labour market tightness is reduced by approximately
93% from 14.0381 to 0.9823. The proportion of high-technology vacancies is in-
creased by 27.3% from 0.2824 to 0.3595. The total unemployment in the economy
increases from 1.6% to 9% and the proportion of untrained unemployed workers
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among all the unemployed increases by 2.12%. The proportion of mismatched
workers among all the trained employed workers increases by about 210%. Hence,
compared to when only mismatched workers are searching on-the-job, when all
workers indulge in on-the-job search in pursuit of better paying jobs, the total
unemployment increases and the proportion of mismatch is increased substan-
tially. The duration of unemployment is also increased substantially from about
3 months to about a year.
Seven wages are obtained when all workers indulge in on-the-job search compared
to 5 when only mismatched workers search for jobs. Untrained workers have two
wages. When employed from unemployment these workers receive a wage, which
is less than the flow value of unemployment. Workers accept this wage cut
because they have a possibility of a wage rise through indulging in on-the-job
search. Untrained workers who are hired from employment receive a wage equal
to their marginal productivity in a low-technology firm.
Trained workers have five possible wages. Those who are hired from unemploy-
ment receive a wage that is a weighted average of the flow value of unemploy-
ment and their marginal productivity in the job. Since trained workers are less
productive in a low-technology firm compared to a high-technology firm, they re-
ceive a lower wage when employed in a low-technology firm from unemployment
compared to a high-technology firm. In other words, when hired from unem-
ployment, mismatched workers receive a lower wage compared to well-matched
trained workers. If these mismatched workers meet another low-technology firm,
they are able to obtain a pay rise through Bertrand competition between the
firms. Such workers stay in their current jobs but obtain a wage equal to their
marginal productivity in a low-technology firm. If however, the mismatched
workers meet a high-technology firm, the workers move jobs but they must ac-
cept a pay cut when mismatched since they have the possibility of searching for
better paying jobs while employed. Such workers obtain a wage lower than the
flow value of unemployment. Such workers must accept a bigger wage cut com-
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pared to untrained workers hired from unemployment, since the wage gain from
on-the-job search is higher for these workers compared to the untrained work-
ers. Finally, if trained workers employed in a high-technology firm meet another
high-technology firm, the workers obtain a pay rise through Bertrand competi-
tion between the employers. Such workers receive a wage equal to the marginal
productivity of trained workers in a high-technology firm.
15.11.1 Comparative Statics
The second row of table 6 shows the equilibrium results, when the flow value of
unemployment, b, is increased from 0.1 to 0.2. The results show that the labour
market tightness is decreased by 9%. The proportion of high-technology vacan-
cies increases by 4%. Total unemployment decreases by 6% and the duration
of unemployment increases slightly from 12.1 months to 12.6 months. The pro-
portion of mismatched workers among the trained employed workers declines by
1.7%. When only mismatched workers indulged in on-the-job search, the total
unemployment increased and mismatch also increased. However, now because
all worker types are searching the increase in flow value of unemployment is not
enough to attract the workers to remain unemployed for longer.
The third row of table 6 shows the equilibrium results, when the cost of a va-
cancy, c, is reduced from 0.5 to 0.3. The results show that the labour market
tightness increases by 69% and the proportion of high-technology vacancies in-
crease by about 6%. Total unemployment decreases by 20% and the duration of
unemployment decreased to about 9.3 months. The proportion of mismatched
workers among the employed trained workers decreases by about 25%. Total
vacancies increase by 68% and the duration of a vacancy increases by 30% from
about 12 months to about 15 months. Thus, when firms face a lower cost of hold-
ing a vacancy, the total number of vacancies as well as their duration increases.
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The fourth row of table 6 shows the equilibrium results, when   is reduced from
0.05 to 0.025. The results show that the labour market tightness decreases by
about 34.4% and the proportion of high-technology vacancies decrease by 5.2%.
The total unemployment decreases by 37% but the duration of unemployment
increases from about 12 months to 15 months. The proportion of mismatched
workers among the employed trained workers is decreased by 27%.
When the share of less educated workers,  0 is increased from 2/3 to 3/4, the
labour market tightness remains almost the same and the proportion of high-
technology firms in the market decrease by 18.4%. Total unemployment de-
creases by 4% and the proportion of untrained unemployed workers among all
the unemployed increased by 7.2%. The share of mismatched workers among the
employed trained workers decreased by 28.7%. Thus, when the share of trained
job seekers is decreased, fewer high-technology jobs are oﬀered and mismatch in
the economy is increased. This is in line with the previous results where only
mismatched workers were searching on-the-job.
When the output gap (yH   yL) is reduced from 0.5 to 0.2, the labour market
tightness decreases by 3% and the proportion of high-technology firms in the mar-
ket decrease by 6.5%. Total unemployment decreases by 1% and the proportion
of untrained unemployed workers among all the unemployed decreased by 0.8%.
The share of mismatched workers among the employed trained workers increased
by 10.6%. Thus, when the productivity gap between untrained and trained work-
ers is reduced, fewer high-technology jobs are oﬀered since the gain to such firms
from employing a trained worker have been reduced. As a consequence the share
of mismatch in the economy increases.
15.11.2 Comparing to DJJ
The baseline results of this variation of the model are more similar to the DJJ
results compared to the model that only allowed mismatched workers to search
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on-the-job. The labour market tightness in my model is 0.98 compared to 1.49
in the DJJ model. The proportion of workers who are unskilled is 64% in my
model compared to 67% in the DJJ model. The proportion of unemployed low-
skilled workers is about 7% in my model compared to 8% in the DJJ model.
The proportion of skilled unemployed workers is almost similar in my model
compared to DJJ (2%). The share of low-skilled employed workers is 60% in my
model compared to 67% in the DJJ model. The share of high-skilled employed
workers is 31% in my model compared to 23% in the DJJ model. The share of
mismatched workers is about 4% compared to 3% in the DJJ model. The biggest
diﬀerence in this variation of the model compared to the DJJ model however,
is in the wages of workers. Whereas, in the DJJ model there are three possible
wages, my model has 7 possible wages.
15.11.3 Welfare Cost of Mismatch
When a highly skilled worker accepts a low-skilled job, there is a potential loss
in welfare to the economy because this worker can only be as productive as the
productivity in a low-skilled job whereas if she/he were to be in a well-matched
job their productivity would be higher (yH > yL). Thus, there is a potential loss
to the economy of workers accepting a job to which they are not suited.
15.12 Wage Variation
As previously, to quantify the eﬀect of these job-to-job transitions on wage dis-
persion, four useful statistics are reported. As a proxy for the degree of between-
group wage inequality, the ratio between the average wage of high ability workers
and the wage of low ability workers is calculated. Likewise, the within-ability
wage inequality is measured by the ratio between the average wage of high-ability
workers and their wage in unskilled jobs. Finally, to control for the relative size
of the two groups, the total variance of the wage distribution, which is further
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decomposed into a permanent component due to between-group wage diﬀerences
and a transitory component due to within-group wage diﬀerences is calculated.
These statistics are reported in Table 7.
Between
Group
Variation
Within
Group
Variation
Between
Group
Variance
Within
Group
Variance
Baseline 1.821 0.247 0.003 0.416
b = 0.2 1.364 0.111 0.011 0.361
c = 0.3 2.131 0.777 0.046 0.848
  = 0.025 0.023 0.005 0.011 0.269
 0 = 0.75 1.542 0.354 0.004 0.486
yH = 1.2 1.786 0.283 0.004 0.419
Table 7
Table 7 shows that our benchmark model yields a considerably higher between-
group wage variation when all workers indulge in on-the-job search, compared
to when only mismatched workers search for jobs when employed. In contrast,
there is a lower between-group wage variance when all workers indulge in on-
the-job search, compared to when only mismatched workers search for jobs when
employed. However, the within-group wage variation is much lower when all
workers indulge in on-the-job search, compared to when only mismatched workers
search for jobs when employed. Again in contrast, there is a higher within-group
variance when all workers indulge in on-the-job search, compared to when only
mismatched workers search for jobs when employed.
The wage dispersion is decreased when the flow value of unemployment is in-
creased, but is substantially exacerbated when the cost of a vacancy is reduced.
When the death rate of a firm  , is reduced the wage dispersion is also re-
duced. When the proportion of untrained workers among the pool of workers is
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increased, the between-group wage variation is reduced but the between-group
wage variance and within-group wage variation and variance are increased. When
the output gap between a trained and an untrained worker is decreased, the
between-group wage variation is reduced but the between-group wage variance
and within-group wage variation and variance are increased.
On-the-job search is a way workers try to reduce mismatch and get a higher
wage. In the process workers end up increasing the wage dispersion between the
diﬀerent types of workers. Trained workers however, are able to reduce the wage
dispersion within their own type.
15.13 USA vs Europe
As previously in this section the model is adapted to reflect the job markets in the
US and in Europe. As noted before, in both markets job-to-job transitions explain
between 40% and 50% of the separations. Also the unemployment rate is higher
in Europe, however, wage inequality is higher in the US. Thus, the parameter
choice in the benchmark model is modified to reflect these facts. To capture the
lower unemployment and higher wage inequality in the US, a higher matching
eﬃciency is assumed for the US labour market than the European one. Thus,
the meeting function is now m(✓) = A√✓, with A = 1.25 for US and A = 1.20 for
Europe. In the current model, this change leads to lower unemployment rates for
both types of workers and a higher in wage dispersion. However, this would lead
to a fall in the share of mismatched workers, which would decline the job-to-job
separations of highly educated workers. Hence, another parameter   is changed
such that the higher flexibility in the US market also means a higher value of  
there. Thus, for the US labour market  0 = 1 and  1 = 0.75 , whereas for the
European labour market  0 = 0.90 and  1 = 0.70 . Table 8 shows the results of
such simulations.
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✓ ⇣ U0 U1 E0 E1 E1L w w wuL wuH wLH wLL wHH
USA 0.57 0.55 0.07 0.0206 0.59 0.3127 0.0287 -1.81 1.00 6.58 1.00 -1.85 1.36 1.50
Europe 0.58 0.64 0.08 0.0227 0.58 0.3107 0.0305 -1.69 1.00 6.03 1.00 -1.80 1.35 1.50
Table 8
The results show that in the first row there is a greater wage dispersion, which
is synonymous to the case of the US, and the second row shows a higher unem-
ployment rate and a lower matching eﬃciency synonymous to Europe.
15.14 Existence of Mismatch
This paper has focused on an economy where highly-skilled workers find it opti-
mal to accept low-skilled jobs. Is it too unrealistic to assume that some workers
will find mismatched jobs attractive? The answer is no. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that around 15.9% of workforce in the UK is highly-skilled but is occupying
a low-skilled job.
This paper tries to explain some of the phenomena that exist in a labour market.
Empirical evidence shows that mismatch exists and that mismatched workers
earn less than their peers in who have a similar level of education to them but
are occupying jobs that are more suited to them. Evidence also suggests that
workers entering employment from unemployment earn less than workers who
take up jobs from employment. On-the-job search and bargaining are important
features of a labour market. By including them in the model my paper is more
realistic that the DJJ paper.
98
16 Conclusion
On-the-job search by workers is an important feature in labour markets. In this
paper I have analysed how this phenomenon aﬀects the structure of employment
and wages in an economy where trained and untrained workers compete for jobs.
I find that when all workers search on-the-job the outcome is worse for the labour
market position of untrained workers than when only-mismatched workers search
on-the-job. This is because it causes a move in the job distribution towards high-
technology jobs and decreases the overall stability of low-technology jobs. These
results are consistent for when the motive of job-to-job transitions is the pursuit
of a better match or when identical workers compete in same job types. When
all worker types search on-the-job the job-to-job transitions are less frequent.
An interesting outcome of this research is that when all workers search on-the-job
the proportion of high-technology vacancies is much higher compared to when
only mismatched workers search during employment. Unemployment rate for
both untrained and trained workers is higher when all worker types search on-
the-job compared to when only mismatched workers search. Mismatch is higher
in the market where all workers indulge in on-the-job search. Looking at the
wage dispersion one observes that between group wage inequality is substantially
exacerbated when all workers indulge in on-the-job search compared to when
only mismatched workers search on the job. However, the within-group wage
inequality is reduced when all workers search on-the-job compared to only the
mismatched workers searching while employed.
On-the-job search is a way in which workers reduce the extent of mismatch and
firms react to this. However, this interaction implies that when more workers try
to relocate the friction in the market reduces the eﬃciency of resource allocation
(by increasing mismatch) and it also creates more wage inequality between the
diﬀerent types of workers.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on wage inequality with on-the-
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job search by exploring the wage determination through a sequential bargaining
game. It also allows for workers to search for jobs not only when they are unem-
ployed but also when they are employed. It also allows not only the mismatched
workers to search on-the-job but allows all worker types to search during employ-
ment and unemployment to improve their wage prospects.
An extension to this research would be to investigate the properties of job-to-
job transitions. A utilitarian social planner might take into account eﬀects of
turnover on the rate of unemployment and employment for both untrained and
trained workers to determine the best frequency of job-to-job transitions.
Another area of research could be to investigate the eﬀects of productivity shocks
and business cycle on the structure of employment and wages when on-the-job
search aﬀects the decisions of workers. Since, search is costly there might be
pro-cyclical fluctuations in search intensities. Thus, for untrained workers com-
petition with trained workers is stiﬀer during recessions. During a boom when
more jobs are created there is a steady release of jobs by trained workers who
move to better paying jobs thus, leaving the vacant jobs for untrained workers.
It would also be interesting to examine wage inequality, and job mobility empir-
ically with a wide range of jobs. It will be interesting to see whether on-the-job
search and mismatch can improve the empirical performance of the search and
matching models.
Finally, it is worth noting that in the model developed, the share of low technology
and high technology firms is fixed and determined by the free entry condition.
This means that the firm side of the market cannot fully respond to the labour
market by adjusting the types of job it oﬀers. Thus, the model develpoed is not
a complete general equilibrium analysis. The firm side analysis is only partially
worked out.
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Part III
Self-selection in Education with
Matching Frictions, on-the-job Search
and Bargaining
18 Abstract
This paper contributes to existing literature by studying the link between edu-
cational choices, and (temporary) skill mismatch in a labour market with search
frictions. The most important feature of this paper is the choice faced by a
government in terms of policy. The paper shows that a policy of giving sub-
sidy to the firms, which lowers their cost of vacancy is much more cost-eﬀective
compared to giving unemployment benefits that give more options to workers.
Another important feature of the paper is the eﬀect on average productivity in
each education group of an increase in the number of people in education. An
increase in the number of people in education means that the ablest among the
uneducated becomes the least able among the educated. Hence, the mean ability
in each education group decreases.
The results show that fewer people invest in education with a high cost of school-
ing and a low cost of firm vacancy. Total unemployment declines slightly with a
declining cost of education. However, while fewer untrained workers are unem-
ployed, the percentage of trained workers who are unemployed increases signif-
icantly and so does the proportion of trained workers accepting jobs oﬀered by
low technology firms. Net output also declines.
If the government target is to reduce the mismatch of workers and jobs, the best
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option is not to decrease cost of education. At the same time in order to increase
the net output in the economy the government can either give unemployment
benefits or lower the cost of firm vacancy by giving subsidies to firms. This way
the threshold level of education is high meaning fewer people choose to get trained
and the average productivity in each education group is high. This model shows
that a government subsidy to the firms, which reduces total unemployment and
increases the net output in the economy, is far more eﬀective than giving money
to the unemployed workers in terms of benefits.
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19 Introduction:
The decision to acquire education is made rationally by people based on several
factors. According to the human capital theory illustrated by Becker (1962), the
decision to invest in human capital rests on comparison with the costs and benefits
of such an investment. Increase in future productivity can be attained only at
a certain cost. These costs include the direct costs of schooling and indirect
costs associated with foregone earnings while acquiring education. This paper’s
contribution is to study the link between educational choices, and (temporary)
skill mismatch in a labour market with search frictions.
Burdett and Smith (2002), show that the investment decision of workers interacts
positively with the decision of firms to oﬀer jobs, such that an economy can get
stuck in a bad trap, with high unemployment as well as a low investment in ed-
ucation. On the other hand Acemoglu (1996) shows that when there is frictional
unemployment, there is an underinvestment in education since workers bear the
cost of education and get paid a share less than their marginal productivity.
This model looks at the steady state equilibrium, where workers self-select them-
selves into education and firms are heterogeneous. Free entry into the market
drives job creation. Search is random, as in Albrecht and Vroman (2002). Due to
labour market frictions, there is unemployment in equilibrium. The productivity
of workers is split in two parts; the first is the innate ability of the worker, while
the second is the sector specific productivity related to education. Like Charlot
and Decreuse (2005) acquiring education is assumed costly but this cost is as-
sumed to be independent of the worker’s ability. This means that given the fixed
cost of investment into education, that is, the tuition fees, only those workers
who are able enough, choose to acquire education and become qualified enough
to work in high-productivity jobs.
The number of people receiving education increases only if less-able individuals
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are drawn into education (i.e. if the cost of education is low). This way the most
able amongst the former uneducated workers become the least able among the
now educated group. This means that the average productivity across the two
groups declines.
Workers search for jobs from unemployment as well as during employment. On-
the-job search allows the workers to obtain a better employment. Frictions in the
market imply that there will always be some level of unemployment in the econ-
omy. Since the labour market is not frictionless it also means that the economy
will always be characterised by some level of skill mismatch. Highly qualified
workers may find it profitable to accept jobs requiring a low skill. Mismatch
is reduced with a higher job turnover. Wages are determined through Cahuc,
Postal-Vinay, Robin (2006), through a sequential bargaining between employers
and workers under complete information.
Several studies have shown the importance of self-selection. Charlot and Decreuse
(2005) build on Roy (1951) multi-sector model of occupational choices. They
show that when frictions characterize markets, individuals fail to internalize the
cost of their decision to acquire education and hence it causes ineﬃciency and
over-education in the market. Cameron and Heckman (1998) argue that any
analysis that ignores the eﬀects of heterogeneity and self-selection on returns to
education, present an overly optimistic view of policies that promote education.
Andolfatto and Smith (2001) use search based frictions in a Roy model to study
the dynamics of sectoral employment after a biased productivity shock. Saint
Paul (1996) creates a model with fixed jobs where firms change their decisions
to allocate vacancies between sectors according to the investment in education
decision of workers.
This paper contributes to existing literature by studying the link between edu-
cational choices, and (temporary) skill mismatch in a labour market with search
frictions. As shown in the paper, “Wage Determination with On-the-Job Search
and Bargaining” (Syed 2015), more workers searching leads to higher inequality
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in wages. If the cost of education is low enough, more individuals choose to
acquire education and get trained. As a consequence mismatch increases.
This model is related to several other matching models, for example Vroman
(1987), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2008) and
Bonilla and Burdett (2010). In these papers there are two sectors with hetero-
geneous workers and firms. There is no self-selection of workers into education.
The skill level of workers is exogenously determined. Other models relevant to
this paper are Burdett and Coles (1997) and Burdett and Wright (1998). These
papers do not have a segmented market. The workers are assigned to a particular
firm through setting reservation productivity. This means that a certain fixed
number of workers meet a fixed number of firms in a market where both agents
are heterogeneous.
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20 Basic Framework
I will develop a steady state matching model of unemployment. There are two
sectors producing a single good. There is a continuum of workers with mass equal
to one. Time is continuous. Agents are risk neutral. Agents discount future at
the rate r > 0. Workers and firms are heterogeneous in skill and technology
respectively. At each instant µ > 0 workers die.
Workers in each cohort are characterised by ability a 2 [0, 1] with distribution  
and an associated density function   > 0 which is continuous. Workers choose
education and become trained e = 1 or remain untrained e = 0, that is e 2 (0, 1).
A worker can be unemployed or employed. Let  0 be the eﬀort with which
unemployed workers search for jobs while  1 be the eﬀort with which employed
workers search on-the-job.  0, 1 are exogenous and assume that  0 >  1. An
unemployed worker receives a flow pay-oﬀ ab from leisure, where 0 < b < 1.
Each employer employs at most one worker. There are two types of jobs available
in the labour market, low-technology (L) and high-technology (H) : j✏{L,H}.
While any type of worker can fill a low-technology job, only trained workers
are productive in high-technology jobs. The output of a match depends on the
worker’s ability a and a worker’s education choice e 2 (0, 1). In low-technology
firm, output yL = a is independent of the worker’s training e. In high-technology
firms, output yH = ⌘a if e = 1, where ⌘ > 1, and is zero otherwise.
There is free entry of firms into each technology sector, where free entry implies
new firms in each sector make zero expected profit. The firms pay a cost c for
posting any vacancy.
There is job destruction which occurs at a rate of   > 0. There is also turnover
through on-the-job search, which I now describe in detail.
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20.1 Matching
Let U0 be the measure of unemployed workers who are untrained and U1 the
measure of unemployed workers who are trained. Let E0 be the measure of
employed workers who are untrained and E1 the measure of employed workers
who are trained. Let E1L denote the measure of trained workers who are employed
in a low-technology firm.
Unemployed workers and vacancies are assumed to meet each other according to
a random matching technology, where M = M(K,V ) denotes the flow number
of contacts.
K =  0(U0 + U1) +  1(E0 + E1), is the aggregate job search eﬀort and V =
VL+VH , are the total vacancies. Assuming constant returns, define labour market
tightness ✓ = V/K andm(✓) = M(K,V )K = M(1, ✓) which describes the arrival rate
of job oﬀers per unit eﬀort.
I assume that m0(✓) > 0 and that lim✓!1m0(✓) = 0.
Unemployed workers sample job oﬀers randomly at Poisson rate  0m(✓). Em-
ployees may also search for a better job while employed and the arrival rate of
oﬀers to on-the-job searchers is  1m(✓).
Similarly, vacancies meet unemployed workers at rate m(✓)✓ . I assume this rate is
decreasing in ✓ and that lim✓!0[m(✓)/✓] =1.
21 Wage Determination
Wages are determined using the Cahuc, Postal-Vinay, Robin (2006) bargaining
framework. Given contact and a gain to trade exists, the wage contract is nego-
tiated following a set of rules that I now explain.
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Wages are bargained over by workers and employers in a complete information
context. Wage contracts stipulate a fixed wage that can be renegotiated by
mutual agreement only: renegotiations thus occur only if one party can credibly
threaten the other to leave the match if the latter refuses to renegotiate. There
are no renegotiation costs.
When between-employer competition for labour services is not perfect, firm-
worker matches are associated with a positive rent, defined as the expected value
of future match output flows net of the worker’s and firm’s outside options.
When an unemployed worker meets a firm, the wage is determined as the worker’s
outside option plus a share   of the match surplus. This game delivers the
generalized Nash-bargaining solution, where the worker receives a constant share
  of the match rent. This latter parameter   is referred to as the worker’s
bargaining power.
When an employed worker contacts an outside firm, the situation becomes more
favourable to the worker because she/he can now force the incumbent and poach-
ing employers to compete. Competition between the two employers over the
worker’s services can be seen as an auction where the bidder with the higher
valuation wins and pays the second price.
21.1 Equilibrium Wage Bargaining
21.1.1 Untrained workers e = 0
While unemployed, let V ue (a) denote the expected lifetime value of a worker of
type (a, e) being unemployed using an optimal strategy. If employed at type
j✏{L,H} firm on wage w, let V je (a, w) denote the expected lifetime payoﬀ.
Since, the flow payoﬀ during unemployment ab > 0, an untrained worker has
no gains to trade with a high-technology firm. This is because these workers
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receive ab > 0 during unemployment while the maximum they can receive in the
high-technology firm is their productivity which is 0.
When the worker is paid her/his marginal productivity, the employer makes zero
marginal profit on this worker, who therefore receives the entire match value
V L0 (a, a). Further assuming that a vacant job has zero value to the employer,
the diﬀerence between the match value V L0 (a, a) and the unemployment value
defines the match surplus:
⇥
V L0 (a, a)  V u0 (a)
⇤
.
When an unemployed worker is matched with a low-technology firm, she/he
obtains her/his reservation utility, V u0 (a) , plus a share   of the maximum match
surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity a
in the low-technology firm. Let w(a) be the equilibrium negotiated wage given
a contact between an untrained, unemployed worker and a low technology firm.
Equilibrium bargaining implies w (a) solves:
V L0 (a, w(a)) = V
u
0 (a) +  
⇥
V L0 (a, a)  V u0 (a)
⇤
(76)
When an untrained employed worker receives an outside job oﬀer, a three-player
bargaining process is started between the worker, her/his initial employer, and
the employer who made the outside oﬀer. No employer will pay more than match
productivity. The auction forces a low-technology firm to place a bid equal to
marginal productivity, a, of the worker in that job.
Let w¯(a) be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between an un-
trained, employed worker and two low-technology firms. Equilibrium bargaining
implies:
w¯(a) = a (77)
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21.1.2 Bargaining with trained workers
Again I start by considering an unemployed trained worker with ability a. Sup-
pose the worker contacts a low-technology firm. The negotiated wage, denoted
wuL(a), solves:
V L1 (a, w
uL(a)) = V u1 (a) +  max
 ⇥
V L1 (a, a)  V u1 (a)
⇤
, 0
 
(78)
When a trained, unemployed worker is matched with a low-technology firm,
she/he obtains her/his reservation utility, V u1 (a) , plus a share   of the maximum
match surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity
a in the low-technology firm. Since,  1 <  0, the worker only accepts the wage
oﬀer if V L1 (a, a) > V u1 (a), otherwise she/he prefers to stay unemployed.
When an unemployed worker is matched with a high-technology firm, she/he
obtains her/his reservation utility, V u1 (a) , plus a share   of the maximum match
surplus that she/he can get with a wage equal to the marginal productivity ⌘a
in the high-technology firm.
Let wuH(a) be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained,
unemployed worker and a high technology firm. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
V H1 (a, w
uH(a)) = V u1 (a) +  
⇥
V H1 (a, ⌘a)  V u1 (a)
⇤
(79)
When a trained worker employed in a low-technology firm receives an outside
job oﬀer from another low-technology firm, a three-player bargaining process
is started between the worker, her/his initial employer, and the employer who
made the outside oﬀer. No employer will pay more than match productivity. The
auction forces a low-technology firm to place a bid equal to marginal productivity,
a, of the worker in that job. The worker stays in her/his current job but her/his
wage is raised to the marginal productivity in the low-technology firm.
Let wLL(a) be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained,
worker employed in a low-technology firm meeting another low-technology firm
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with a Bertrand Competition. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
wLL(a) = a (80)
When a trained employed worker employed in a high-technology firm receives
an outside job oﬀer from another high-technology firm, a three-player bargaining
process is started between the worker, her/his initial employer, and the employer
who made the outside oﬀer. No employer will pay more than match productivity.
The auction forces a high-technology firm to place a bid equal to marginal pro-
ductivity, ⌘a, of the worker in that job. The worker stays in her/his current job
but her/his wage is raised to the marginal productivity in the high-technology
firm.
Let wHH(a) be the equilibrium negotiated wage given a contact between a trained
worker employed in a high-technology firm who meets another high-technology
firm. Equilibrium bargaining implies:
wHH(a) = ⌘a (81)
Lemma 6:
When a type-e = 1 employee in a j = L firm receives an outside oﬀer from a
j = H firm, the worker moves to the j = H firm, where she/he gets wage wLH(a)
that solves:
V H1 (a, w
LH(a)) = V L1 (a, a) +  
⇥
V H1 (a, ⌘a)  V L1 (a, a)
⇤
(82)
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Proof:
⌘a is the highest wage in the market, it is always better to earn this wage than
any other wage. Thus, V H1 (a, ⌘a) > V L1 (a, a). The highest wage a low-technology
firm can oﬀer is a which the worker values at V L1 (a, a). The employee receives a
positive surplus on top of this outside option from moving and hence prefers to
move from a j = L firm to a j = H firm. Q.E.D.
Note that the wage wLH(a) obtained in the new firm can be smaller than the
wage paid in the previous job, because the worker expects larger wage rises in
firms with higher productivity. This option value eﬀect implies that workers may
be willing to take wage cuts just to move from a low- to a high-technology firm.
This section determines
W =
⇥
w (a) , w¯ (a) , wuL (a) , wuH (a) , wLH (a) , wLL (a) , wHH (a)
⇤
as a function of
(a, e) , V ue (a) and V je (a, w). The next step is to determine V ue (a) and V je (a, w)
consistent with W (a, e).
22 Worker’s Problem
22.1 Untrained Worker e = 0
Let ⇣ = VLVL+VH denote the fraction of vacancies which are oﬀered by low-technology
firms. As untrained workers have no gains to trade with high-technology firms,
their eﬀective arrival rate of job oﬀers is  0⇣m(✓) during unemployment and
 1⇣m(✓) during employment.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 0
when unemployed is:
(r + µ)V u0 (a) = ab+  0m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L0 (a, w(a))  V u0 (a)
⇤
(83)
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The value of unemployment for an untrained worker incorporates the assump-
tion that an untrained worker is not productive in a high-technology job. The
gains from trade from the job are
⇥
V L0 (a, w(a))  V u0 (a)
⇤
. The flow payoﬀ from
unemployment is ab.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 0
hired from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V L0 (a, w (a)) = w (a) +  
⇥
V u0 (a)  V L0 (a, w (a))
⇤
+ 1m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L0 (a, w¯ (a))  V L0 (a, w (a))
⇤
(84)
The flow value of an untrained worker hired from unemployment equals the
sum of the flow return, w (a), plus the expected instantaneous capital loss,
 
⇥
V u0 (a)  V L0 (a, w (a))
⇤
from the job breaking and the capital gain from on-
the-job search. An untrained worker meets a low-technology firm at the rate
 1m (✓) ⇣. Both firms will oﬀer a single wage w¯ (a) > w (a). Assuming that it is
costly to move the worker stays with the current employer but is able to make
capital gains of
⇥
V L0 (a, w¯ (a))  V L0 (a, w (a))
⇤
.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 0
hired from employment is:
(r + µ)V L0 (a, w¯ (a)) = w¯ (a) +  
⇥
V u0 (a)  V L0 (a, w¯ (a))
⇤
(85)
The flow value of an untrained worker hired from employment equals the sum of
the flow return, w¯ (a), plus the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u0 (a)  V L0 (a, w¯ (a))
⇤
from the job breaking. There are no capital gains from on-the-job search.
Note the 3 equations (83-85) which determine V u0 (a), V L0 (a, a) and V L0 (a, w(a)).
As equation (76) determined w(a) there are 4 equations for 4 unknowns.
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Lemma 7
For an e = 0 worker with ability a, wage w(a), w¯(a) and corresponding value
functions V u0 (a) and V
j
0 (a, w(a)) for j = L,H a solution exists and is bound for
all ⇣ 2 [0, 1] and ✓   0. Equilibrium wage bargaining implies:
V u0 (a) =
a
r + µ
⇢
b

r + µ+  
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
 
+

 0m(✓)⇣ 
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
  
2 [ ab
r + µ
,
a
r + µ
] (86)
V L0 (a, a) =
a
r + µ
⇢
b

 
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
 
+

r + µ+  0m(✓)⇣ 
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
  
2 [ ab
r + µ
,
a
r + µ
] (87)
V L0 (a, w(a)) =
a
r + µ
⇢
b

(r + µ) (1   ) +  
r + µ+   +  0m (✓) ⇣ 
 
+

[(r + µ)   +  0m(✓)⇣ ]
r + µ+   +  0m (✓) ⇣ 
  
2 [ ab
r + µ
,
a
r + µ
] (88)
w¯(a) = a (89)
w(a) = ab  a (1  b)

 1m (✓) ⇣ (1   )
r + µ+  
 
< ab (90)
Note the wage w (a) < ab, the flow pay-oﬀ from leisure. Hence workers are
willing to take wage cuts because they expect a larger wage rises through on-the-
job search.
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22.2 Trained Worker e = 1
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 1
when unemployed is:
(r + µ)V u1 (a) = ab+  0m (✓) ⇣max{[V L1 (a, wuL(a))  V u1 (a)], 0}
+ 0m (✓) (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
a, wuH(a)
   V u1 (a)⇤ (91)
The value of unemployment for a trained worker incorporates the assumption that
these workers might be productive in both low and high technologies. An unem-
ployed trained worker meets a low-technology firm at an arrival rate of  0m (✓) ⇣
and a high-technology firm at an arrival rate of  0m (✓) (1  ⇣). The gains from
trade with a high-technology firm are [V H1 (a, wuH(a)) V u1 (a)]. Assuming surplus
exists the gains from trade with a low-technology firm are [V L1 (a, wuL(a)) V u1 (a)]
and zero otherwise. The flow payoﬀ from unemployment is ab.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 1
employed in a j = L firm hired from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V L1
 
a, wuL(a)
 
= wuL (a) +  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V L1
 
a, wuL (a)
 ⇤
+ 1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
a, wLH (a)
   V L1  a, wuL (a) ⇤
+ 1m (✓) ⇣
⇥
V L1 (a, a)  V L1
 
a, wuL (a)
 ⇤
(92)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in low-technology
firm hired from unemployment equals the sum of the flow return, wuL (a), plus
the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V L1
 
a, wuL (a)
 ⇤
from the
job breaking up and the capital gains from on-the-job search. With an ar-
rival rate of  1m (✓) (1  ⇣), the worker meets a high-technology firm and gains
[V H1
 
a, wLH (a)
  V L1  a, wuL (a) ]. With an arrival rate of  1m (✓) ⇣ the worker
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meets a low-technology firm. Assuming moving is costly, the worker stays with
the current employer but is able to bargain her/his wage to wLL (a) = a, where
a > wuL (a). The gain to the worker in this case is
⇥
V L1 (a, a)  V L1
 
a, wuL (a)
 ⇤
.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 1
employed in a j = L firm hired from employment is:
(r + µ)V L1
 
a, wLL (a)
 
= wLL(a) +  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V L1
 
a, wLL (a)
 ⇤
+ 1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
a, wLH (a)
   V L1  a, wLL (a) ⇤ (93)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in a low-technology
firm hired from employment equals the sum of the flow return, wLL (a) = a,
plus the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V L1
 
a, wLL (a)
 ⇤
from
the job breaking up and the capital gains from on-the-job search. With an
arrival rate of  1m (✓) (1  ⇣), the worker meets a high-technology firm and gains⇥
V H1
 
a, wLH (a)
   V L1  a, wLL (a) ⇤. There are no gains from trade if this worker
meets another low-technology firm.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 1
employed in a j = H firm hired from unemployment is:
(r + µ)V H1
 
a, wuH (a)
 
= wuH (a) +  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V H1
 
a, wuH (a)
 ⇤
+ 1m (✓) ⇣max
 ⇥
V L1 (a, a)  V H1
 
a, wuH (a)
 ⇤
, 0
 
+ 1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
⇥
V H1
 
a, wHH (a)
   V H1  a, wuH (a) ⇤ (94)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in a high-technology
firm hired from unemployment equals the sum of the flow return, wuH (a), plus
the expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V H1
 
a, wuH (a)
 ⇤
from the
job breaking up and the capital gains from on-the-job search. With an arrival
rate of  1m (✓) ⇣, the worker meets a low-technology firm. Assuming surplus
exists the worker gains [V L1 (a, a)   V H1
 
a, wuH (a)
 
] and zero otherwise. The
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worker meets a high-technology firm at an arrival rate  1m (✓) (1   ⇣). The
worker’s current employer and the new employer enter a bid for the worker’s
services. Assuming moving is costly, the worker stays with the current employer
but is able to bargain her/his wage to wHH (a) = ⌘a, where ⌘a > wuH (a). The
capital gains are
⇥
V H1
 
a, wHH (a)
   V H1  a, wuH (a) ⇤.
The Bellman equation describing the value of a type (a, e) worker with e = 1
employed in a j = H firm hired from employment is:
(r + µ)V H1
 
a, wHH (a)
 
= wHH (a) +  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V H1
 
a, wHH (a)
 ⇤
(95)
The flow value of employment of a trained worker employed in a high-technology
firm hired from employment equals the sum of the flow return, wHH (a), plus the
expected instantaneous capital loss,  
⇥
V u1 (a)  V H1
 
a, wHH (a)
 ⇤
from the job
breaking. There are no capital gains from on-the-job search.
Note the 5 equations (91-95) which determine V u1 (a) and V
j
1 (a, w
ij(a)). As equa-
tions (78-79) and (82) determined wuL(a), wuH(a) and wLH(a) there are 8 equa-
tions for 8 unknowns.
Lemma 8
For an e = 1 worker with ability a, wage wij(a) and corresponding value functions
V u1 (a) and V
j
1 (a, w
ij(a)) for i = u, L,H and j = L,H a solution exists and is
bound for all ⇣ 2 [0, 1] and ✓   0.
Proof
Equilibrium wage bargaining implies:
V H1 (a, ⌘a) =
⌘a+  V u1 (a)
r + µ+  
2 [ab, ⌘a] (96)
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V L1 (a, a) =
a+  V u1 (a) +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)  V H1 (a, ⌘a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)   2 [ab, ⌘a] (97)
V H1 (a, w
LH(a)) = (1   )V L1 (a, a) +  V H1 (a, ⌘a) 2 [ab, ⌘a] (98)
V H1 (a, w
uH(a)) = (1   )V u1 (a) +  V H1 (a, ⌘a) 2 [ab, ⌘a] (99)
V L1 (a, w
uL(a)) = (1   )V u1 (a) +  V H1 (a, a) 2 [ab, ⌘a] (100)
V u1 (a) =
ab+   0m(✓)
⇥
⇣V L1 (a, a) + (1  ⇣)V H1 (a, ⌘a)
⇤
r + µ+  0m (✓)  
2 [ab, ⌘a] (101)
Each value function is continuous. Further, each value function is a function of
another value function multiplied by a discount factor < 1. Also, each value
function is bounded between [ab, ⌘a]. By Brouwer fixed-point theorem, there
exists at least one continuously diﬀerentiable solution on [ab, ⌘a].
23 Optimal Education Choice
Solving for V u0 (a) and V u1 (a) gives:
V u0 (a) =
ab
r + µ
+
a
r + µ
⇢
 0m(✓)⇣  (1  b)
r + µ+   +  0m(✓)⇣ 
  
(102)
and
V u1 (a) =
r + µ+  
r + µ+   +  0m (✓)  
ab
r + µ
+
r + µ+  
r + µ+   +  0m (✓)  
a
r + µ

 0m (✓)   [(r + µ+  ) ⇣ + [r + µ+   +  1m (✓)  ] (1  ⇣) ⌘]
(r + µ+  ) [r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)  ]
 
(103)
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Lemma 9
V u0 (a) is an increasing function of ✓ and ⇣, whereas V u1 (a) is an increasing func-
tion of ✓ but a decreasing function of ⇣. Hence, there must be one point at which
the two value functions V u0 (a) and V u1 (a) cross each other.
Proof
When m (✓) = 0, V u0 (a) = abr+µ ,
when m (✓) > 0, V u0 (a) = abr+µ +
a
r+µ
n
 0m(✓)⇣ (1 b)
r+µ+ + 0m(✓)⇣ 
o
> abr+µ .
When m (✓) = 0, V u1 (a) = abr+µ ,
when m (✓) > 0,
V u1 (a) =
r+µ+ 
r+µ+ + 0m(✓) 
n
ab
r+µ +
a
r+µ
h
 0m(✓) [(r+µ+ )⇣+[r+µ+ + 1m(✓) ](1 ⇣)⌘]
(r+µ+ )[r+µ+ + 1m(✓)(1 ⇣) ]
io
> abr+µ .
When ⇣ = 0, V u0 (a) = abr+µ ,
when ⇣ = 1, V u0 (a) = abr+µ +
a
r+µ
n
 0m(✓) (1 b)
r+µ+ + 0m(✓) 
o
> abr+µ .
Finally, when ⇣ = 0, V u1 (a) =
r+µ+ 
r+µ+ + 0m(✓) 
n
ab
r+µ +
a
r+µ
h
 0m(✓) ⌘
r+µ+ 
io
,
and when ⇣ = 1,
V u1 (a) =
r+µ+ 
r+µ+ + 0m(✓) 
n
ab
r+µ +
a
r+µ
h
 0m(✓) 
r+µ+ 
io
< r+µ+ r+µ+ + 0m(✓) 
n
ab
r+µ +
a
r+µ
h
 0m(✓) ⌘
r+µ+ 
io
Since V u0 (a) and V u1 (a) are continuous and diﬀerentiable, there must be a point
where the two functions cross each other.
23.1 Education Choice
Acquiring education is costly. Let C > 0 be the cost of schooling independent
of ability. At birth, each individual compares the expected lifetime gain from
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getting educated and invests accordingly. An individual with ability a decides to
get educated if and only if:
V u1 (a)   V u0 (a) + C (104)
The RHS of the equation is the sum of the opportunity cost V u0 (a) plus the direct
schooling cost C. The utility levels V u0 (a) and V u1 (a) depend on the fraction of
vacancies which are oﬀered by each firm type [⇣, (1  ⇣)] and the job-finding rate
m (✓) in each market.
23.2 Self-selection Rule
The threshold individual, with innate ability a, is indiﬀerent between education
and no education. Let ac be the critical cutoﬀ ability such that a   ac ) e = 1
and a < ac ) e = 0. The cutoﬀ ability ac ⇢ (0, 1) is such that V u1 (a) = V u0 (a) C.
Since, V u0 (a) and V u1 (a) are linear functions of a, we can denote:
V u0 (a) = a 
u
0
and
V u1 (a) = a 
u
1
This implies:
ac [ u1    u0 ] = C
Therefore,
ac =
C
 u1    u0
(105)
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Lemma 10
When the fraction of low skilled vacancies ⇣ increases,  u1    u0 , decreases and
hence, the cutoﬀ ability ac increases.
Proof
When ⇣ = 0,  u1    u0 =  0m(✓) {(r+µ+ )(⌘ b)+ 0m(✓) ⌘}(r+µ)(r+µ+ )[r+µ+ + 0m(✓) ] ,
and when ⇣ = 1,  u1  u0 = ( 0m(✓) )
2
(r+µ)(r+µ+ )[r+µ+ + 0m(✓) ]
<  0m(✓) {(r+µ+ )(⌘ b)+ 0m(✓) ⌘}(r+µ)(r+µ+ )[r+µ+ + 0m(✓) ] .
That is, the more low-skilled vacancies in the market, fewer people decide to
invest in education.
The eﬀect of labour market tightness ✓, on  u1   u0 and hence, on ac is unknown.
23.3 Composition Eﬀect
The average abilities across the pools of unemployed in each sector are functions
of the cut-oﬀ ability ac such that:
a0 = E (a | a < ac) =
acˆ
0
  (a)
  (ac)
ada (106)
a1 = E (a | a > ac) =
1ˆ
ac
  (a)
1    (ac)ada (107)
Thus, a shift in the selection threshold ac involves a composition eﬀect. The
average productivity in each education group is increasing in ac. Increase in ac
(i.e. the number of people in education goes down) means the least able among
the educated becomes the ablest among the uneducated. The mean ability in
each education group increases.
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24 Firm’s Problem With Free Entry
Let J je (a, w) denote the expected lifetime value of a firm of type j✏{L,H} em-
ploying a worker with training e 2 (0, 1), paying wage w. There is free entry of
firms into each technology sector. Free entry implies new firms in each sector
make zero expected profit. The value to the firm of a vacancy is zero.
24.1 Low-Technology Firm
Consider a low-technology firm holding a vacancy. Trained workers might find it
worthwhile to accept these jobs.
The expected payoﬀ of a low-technology firm holding a vacancy is:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢
 0U0
K
ˆ ac
0
[JL0 (a, w (a))]
 
dGu (a)
 
+
m (✓)
✓
⇢
 0U1
K
ˆ 1
ac
max
 ⇥
JL1
 
a, wuL (a)
 ⇤
, 0
 
dGu (a)
 
(108)
Conditional on a worker contact,  0U0K is the probability the worker is untrained
and unemployed and  0U1K is the probability the worker is trained and unemployed.
Vacancies meet unemployed workers at the rate m(✓)✓ . The capital gain from
hiring an untrained worker is JL0 (a, w (a)) and from hiring a trained worker is
JL1
 
a, wuL (a)
 
.
Consider a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker. There is no gain to
the firm from hiring a worker from employment.
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker from
employment is:
JL0 (a, w (a)) = 0 (109)
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The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm hiring an untrained worker from
unemployment is:
JL0 (a, w (a)) =
a  w (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) ⇣
(110)
The worker-firm match is dissolved if the job is destroyed by a shock  , or if
the worker changes her/his job.  1m (✓) ⇣ is the probability the worker meets a
low-technology firm and changes her/his job. a   w (a) is the gain to the firm
from hiring an untrained worker who produces a and is paid w (a).
Consider a low-technology firm hiring a trained worker. There is no gain to the
firm from hiring a worker from employment.
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm employing a trained worker from
employment is:
JL1
 
a, wLL (a)
 
= 0 (111)
The expected payoﬀ to a low-technology firm employing a trained worker hired
from unemployment is:
JL1
 
a, wuL (a)
 
=
a  wuL (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
(112)
The worker-firm match is dissolved either if the worker changes her/his job, or if
the job is destroyed by a shock. a wuL (a) is the gain to the firm from hiring a
worker who produces a and is paid a wage wuL (a). With a probability  , the job
is destroyed by a shock. With a probability  1m(✓) the worker meets another
firm (low or high-technology).
24.2 High-Technology Firm
Consider a high-technology firm holding a vacancy. The expected payoﬀ to a
high-technology firm holding a vacancy is:
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c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢ˆ 1
ac
 0U1
K
⇥
JH1
 
a, wuH (a)
 ⇤
dGu (a)
 
+
m (✓)
✓
⇢ˆ 1
ac
 1E1L
K
max
 ⇥
JH1
 
a, wLH (a)
 ⇤
, 0
 
dGu (a)
 
(113)
The value to a high-technology firm holding a vacancy reflects the assumption
that only trained workers are able to perform these jobs. Conditional on a worker
contact, firms meet trained unemployed job seekers at a rate m(✓)✓
 0U1
K and trained
workers employed in a low-technology firm at a rate m(✓)✓
 1E1L
K . The capital gain
from hiring a trained unemployed worker is
⇥
JH1
 
a, wuH (a)
 ⇤
. Assuming surplus
exists, the capital gain from hiring a trained worker employed in a low-technology
firm is
⇥
JH1
 
a, wLH (a)
 ⇤
, otherwise it is 0.
Consider a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker. There is no gain to the
firm from hiring a worker from employment.
The expected payoﬀ to a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from em-
ployment in a high-technology firm is:
JH1
 
a, wHH (a)
 
= 0 (114)
The expected payoﬀ to a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from un-
employment is:
JH1
 
a, wuH (a)
 
=
⌘a  wuH (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣) (115)
⌘a   wuH (a) is the gain to the firm from hiring a trained worker who produces
⌘a and is paid wuH (a). With a probability  , the job is destroyed. With a
probability  1m (✓) (1  ⇣), the worker meets a high-technology firm.
The expected payoﬀ to a high-technology firm hiring a trained worker from em-
ployment in a low-technology firm is:
JH1
 
a, wLH (a)
 
=
⌘a  wLH (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
(116)
The worker-firm match is dissolved either if the worker changes her/his job, or if
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the job is destroyed by a shock. ⌘a wLH (a) is the gain to the firm from hiring
a worker who produces ⌘a and is paid a wage wLH (a). With a probability  , the
job is destroyed by a shock. With a probability  1m(✓) the worker meets another
firm (low or high-technology).
24.3 Firm Equilibrium with Free Entry
Equations (108)  (116) can be reduced to two equations given by:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢ˆ ac
0
 0U0
K

a  w (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) ⇣
  
dGu (a)
 
+
m (✓)
✓
⇢ˆ 1
ac
 0U1
K
max
⇢
a  wuL (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
 
, 0
 
dGu (a)
 
(117)
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢ˆ 1
ac
 0U1
K

⌘a  wuH (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
 
dGu (a)
 
(118)
+
m (✓)
✓
⇢ˆ 1
ac
 1E1L
K
max
⇢
⌘a  wLH (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓)
 
, 0
 
dGu (a)
 
25 Steady State Conditions
This model analyses the market in a steady state. Workers maximize expected
discounted income. Firms maximize expected discounted profit. The steady state
conditions are the following:
The first steady state condition states that the outflow of untrained workers from
unemployment equals their inflow back into unemployment.
U0 0m (✓) ⇣ = [ (a
c)  U0]   (119)
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The flow of untrained workers out of unemployment is U0 (the measure of unem-
ployed untrained workers) multiplied by  0⇣m (✓) (the arrival rate of untrained
unemployed workers).
The flow into unemployment is then   (the job destruction rate) multiplied by
the mass of employed untrained workers, (  (ac)  U0), (proportion of untrained
workers in the population minus those within them who are unemployed). Thus,
U0 =
  (ac)
  +  0m (✓) ⇣
(120)
The second steady state condition states that the outflow of trained workers from
unemployment equals their inflow back into unemployment.
U1 0m (✓) = [(1   (ac))  U1]   (121)
 0m (✓) is the arrival rate of trained workers. The outflow of trained workers is
the arrival rate multiplied by the measure of trained unemployed workers, U1.
There are 1    (ac) trained workers of whom U1 are unemployed. Subtracting
the later from former multiplied by the job destruction rate, gives the inflow of
trained workers into unemployment. Thus,
U1 =
  [1   (ac)]
  +  0m (✓)
(122)
The third steady-state condition states that the outflow from unemployment of
trained workers employed in low-technology firms equals their inflow back into
unemployment.
U1 0m (✓) ⇣ = [  +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)]E1L (123)
The outflow of trained workers employed in a low-technology firm from unem-
ployment is given by U1 0m (✓) ⇣. There are U1 trained unemployed people. With
an arrival rate of  0m (✓) ⇣, they meet a firm with a low-technology.
The inflow of trained workers employed in low-technology firms into unemploy-
ment happens when either the job is destroyed by a shock or there is worker
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turnover through on-the-job search. There are E1L trained workers employed
in low-technology firms. The probability of of meeting a high-technology job is
 1m (✓) (1  ⇣), and the job is destroyed at an exogenous rate,  . Thus,
E1L =
 0m (✓) ⇣  [1   (ac)]
[  +  0m (✓)] [  +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)] (124)
26 Equilibria
I will consider two types of equilibria; one in which trained workers do not find
it optimal to accept jobs from low-technology firms and one in which they do.
Consistent with Albrecht and Vroman (2002) the former is called an ex-post seg-
mentation equilibrium and the later a cross-skill matching equilibrium. These
two equilibria are mutually exclusive. In case of ex-post segmentation, highly
qualified workers do not find it profitable to accept low-technology jobs, which
means
h
⌘a wLH(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)
i
 0 and
h
a wuL(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)
i
 0. In a cross-skill matching equi-
librium these two surpluses are positive. Empirical evidence suggests that around
31% of the UK workforce is mismatched (over and under-educated) while around
69% of the workforce is well-matched. Thus, even though an ex-post segmenta-
tion equilibrium is less relevant to my paper, it is still an important equilibrium
since it explains the job market conditions of a majority of UK workforce.
26.1 Ex-Post Segmentation
This equilibrium can be reduced to a set of two equations given by:
c =
m (✓)
✓
⇢ˆ ac
0
 0U0
K

a  w (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) ⇣
  
dGu (a)
 
(125)
c =
m (✓)
✓
ˆ 1
ac
 0U1
K

⌘a  wuH (a)
r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)
 
dGu (a) (126)
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where U0 is given by (120), U1 is given by (122), w (a) is given by (90) and
wuH (a) is given by:
wuH (a) =
[r + µ+   +  1m (✓) (1  ⇣)] (1   ) ab
[r + µ+   +  0m (✓) (1  ⇣)  ]
+ {[r + µ+   +  0m (✓) (1  ⇣)]      1m (✓) (1  ⇣) (1   )} ⌘a
[r + µ+   +  0m (✓) (1  ⇣)  ] (127)
Lemma 11
Equation (125) is a decreasing function of ✓ and ⇣, whereas equation (126) is a
decreasing function of ✓ and an increasing function of ⇣. Hence, there must be
one point at which the two functions cross each other.
Proof
Since, m(✓)✓ is a decreasing function of ✓, both equation (50) and (51) are decreas-
ing functions of ✓.
For equation (125):
When ⇣ = 0,
h
a w(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)⇣
i
= a abr+µ+  .
When ⇣ = 1,
h
a w(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)⇣
i
=
h
a ab
r+µ+ 
i h
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)(1  )
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)
i
<
h
a ab
r+µ+ 
i
.
Also, when ⇣ increases from 0 to 1, U0 decreases from  (ac) to   (a
c)
 + 0m(✓)
.
Hence, equation (125) is a decreasing function of ⇣.
For equation (126):
U1 is independent of ⇣.
However, when ⇣ = 0,
h
⌘a wuH(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)(1 ⇣)
i
= (1  )(⌘a ab)r+µ+ + 0m(✓)  .
And when ⇣ = 1,
h
⌘a wuH(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)(1 ⇣)
i
= (1  )(⌘a ab)r+µ+  >
(1  )(⌘a ab)
r+µ+ + 0m(✓) 
.
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Hence, equation (126) is an increasing function of ⇣.
Since, both (125) and (126) are continuous, there must be one point at which
the two functions cross each other.
26.2 Uniqueness
Re-write equation (125) as:
z() =  c+ m(✓)✓
h´ ac
0
 0U0
K
h
a w(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)⇣
ii
dGu (a)
and equation (126) as:
x() =  c+ m(✓)✓
´ 1
ac
 0U1
K
h
⌘a wuH(a)
r+µ+ + 1m(✓)(1 ⇣)
i
dGu (a)
Lemma 12
z()and x() satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference if for any vectors ✓0 and
✓1, where ✓0 < ✓1,
z(✓0) 6= z(✓1) and ✓0z(✓1)  0 implies ✓1z(✓0) > 0
x(✓0) 6= x(✓1) and ✓0x(✓1)  0 implies ✓1x(✓0) > 0
If z() and x() satisfy the weak axiom, then for any constant returns to scale
technology, the set of equilibrium vectors is convex. If in addition the economy is
regular, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof
Since ✓0 < ✓1, and m(✓)✓ is a decreasing function of ✓, then z(✓0) 6= z(✓1) and
✓0z(✓1)  0 implies ✓1z(✓0) > 0. Also x(✓0) 6= x(✓1) and ✓0x(✓1)  0 implies
✓1x(✓0) > 0.
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26.3 Cross-Skill Matching
A cross-skill matching steady-state equilibrium with on-the-job search consists of
the wage w(a) given by (90) and a set of value functions for V u1 (a) and V
j
1 (a, w)
that satisfy (96-101) plus a vector [✓, ⇣, ac, U0, U1, E1L] such that:
1. All matches produce a non-negative surplus for the equilibrium values of
{✓, ⇣, ac}.
2. The vector [✓, ⇣, ac, U0, U1, E1L] solves the steady state conditions (120), (122)
and (124) plus the free entry conditions (117) and (118).
26.4 Numerical Solutions
I will solve the cross-skill matching equilibrium using numerical solutions. I will
assume a standard Cobb-Douglas meeting function with a constant elasticity of
0.5, i.e m (✓) = B
p
✓, with B assumed to be equal to one. Time is measured in
quarters. The parameters are, r = 0.01, µ = 0.15,   = 0.15, c = 0.25, b = 0.1,
 1 = 0.5,  0 = 0.7, C = 0.5 and ⌘ = 1.5. Below are the results obtained in
equilibrium:
Equilibrium =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
✓ = 10.61
⇣ = 0.93
ac = 0.98
U0 = 0.04
U1 = 0.001
E1L = 0.01
For the chosen parameters a unique equilibrium is obtained. The labour market
tightness is around 10.61, which implies that unemployment duration is about
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3.7 months and the duration of a vacancy of about 13 quarters. Low technology
firms oﬀer most of the vacancies in the market (93%). The cut-oﬀ ability below
which workers do not acquire education is 0.98. Thus, since low-technology firms
oﬀer most of the jobs available, most of the workers choose to get no training.
Of all the workers about 4% are unemployed. The share of untrained workers
among the unemployed workers is 97.56%. Of all the trained employed workers
about 41.96% are employed in a low-technology firm.
27 Policy
For the purpose of policy I am interested in focussing on the case where trained
workers find it profitable to accept low-technology jobs.
Although obtaining the optimal policy is ideal, in this model it is very com-
plicated. I will thus, look at comparative statics to understand the interaction
between education and mismatch. I will compute the output produced net of all
costs (cost of education for workers and cost of vacancy for a firm). This will
enable me to obtain a policy that improves on the existing outcome. Table 1
shows the results when diﬀerent policy variables are changed.
✓ ⇣ ac U0 U1 E1L Y Y   C Net Y
Baseline 10.61 0.93 0.98 0.04 0.001 0.01 0.4477 0.4474 0.197
C = 0.25 10.02 0.92 0.49 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.2969 0.2315 -0.018
b = 0.2 12.06 0.94 0.98 0.04 0.001 0.01 0.4513 0.4511 0.201
c = 0.5 10.36 0.21 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.6002 0.2356 -0.264
Table 1
The second row of table 1 shows the equilibrium results for the baseline model.
When the cost of acquiring education, C, is decreased from 0.5 to 0.25, the la-
bour market tightness is decreased by 5.53%. The proportion of low-technology
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vacancies decreases by 0.16%. The cut-oﬀ ability at which workers decide to ac-
quire education decreases significantly (from 0.98 to 0.49). Total unemployment
stays almost the same (unemployment for untrained workers decreases by 50%
while that for trained workers increases by 2164%). The duration of unemploy-
ment increases from 3.7 months to 3.8 months. The proportion of mismatched
workers among the trained employed workers increases substantially from 1% to
21% (an increase of 2106%). Total output produced decreases by 33.68%. This is
interesting because although with a decrease in the cost of education more work-
ers choose to get educated the total output produced in the economy declines.
Looking more closely at the results one sees that in the baseline model most of
the workers are untrained (about 98%). Thus, the output produced by trained
workers has little contribution towards the total output produced. When the cost
of education is decreased nearly half the workers choose to invest in education.
However, since the gap between the productivity of the two types of workers
is not very high, the total output produced by untrained employed workers in
the baseline model exceeds the total output produced by trained workers when
the cost of education is lowered simply because there are many more untrained
workers in the baseline model than there are trained workers when the cost of
education has declined.
Note that the share of low technology and high technology firms is fixed and
determined by the free entry condition. Thus, when the cost of education is
decreased and many more workers choose to get educated the firm side of the
market does not respond by adjusting the types of job it oﬀers. This is a lim-
itation of the model, which can be addressed by endogenously determining the
share of low and high technology firms. Due to this limitation, about 21% of the
workers are now mismatched and these workers have the same technology spe-
cific productivity as the untrained workers. Mean ability in each education group
decreases with a decrease in ac. Since output is lower in this new equilibrium the
net output is also lower compared to the baseline model. Thus, a decrease in the
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cost of education without the firm side of the market responding ends up having
a very high social cost.
The third row of table 1 shows the equilibrium results, when the unemployment
benefit independent of ability, b, is increased from 0.1 to 0.2. The results show
that the labour market tightness increases by about 13.75%. The proportion of
low-technology vacancies increases by 1%. The cut-oﬀ ability at which workers
decide to acquire education remains the same. The total unemployment also
remains the same but the duration of unemployment decreases from about 3.7
months to 3.5 months. The proportion of mismatched workers among the em-
ployed trained workers remains constant but the total output produced increases
by 0.8%. Output net of education cost increases by 2%. Thus, a 100% increase
in unemployment benefit increases net output by only 2%.
The fourth row of table 1 shows the equilibrium results, when the cost of a va-
cancy, c, is increased from 0.25 to 0.5. The results show that the labour market
tightness decreases by 2.3% and the proportion of low technology vacancies de-
crease substantially from 93% to 21% (a decrease of about 77.5%). The threshold
level of education decreases significantly from 0.98 to 0.15 (a decrease of 85%).
Total unemployment increases by 37.2% and the duration of unemployment re-
mains almost the same. The proportion of mismatched workers among the em-
ployed trained workers also remains almost the same. Total output produced
in the economy increases by 33% but the output net of all costs decreases by
234%. Thus, an increase in the cost of vacancy shifts the market in favour of
high-technology firms. As a result more workers choose to invest in education
and with more trained individuals in the economy total output increases. How-
ever, this increase in output comes at a cost of an increase in the total costs.
Thus, output net of all costs declines substantially.
As stated before, the average productivity in each education group is increasing
in ac. When ac goes up (i.e. the number of people in education goes down), the
least able among the educated becomes the ablest among the uneducated. The
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mean ability in each education group increases.
The government has three options; give a direct subsidy (or enforce a direct tax)
to students for the cost of education, give unemployment benefits to unemployed
workers, or give subsidy (or enforce a tax on) to the firms to lower (increase) the
cost of posting a vacancy.
A government or social planner cares about the net output produced in the
economy. Since a declining cost of education is associated with more workers
choosing to get trained with the firm side of the economy not responding to this
change eﬀectively, the net output in the economy declines. Hence, it is in the
interest of the government to keep the cost of education high so that only a small
proportion of workers get trained. This ensures that only a small percentage
of trained workers accept low-technology jobs. It is also in the interest of the
government to give subsidies to firms to lower their cost of vacancy and increase
the benefits to unemployed workers. However, in this example a 100% increase
in the unemployment benefit increases the net output by only 2%. Thus, the
government should oﬀer subsidies to the firms to lower their cost of vacancy. In
this example halving the cost of subsidy has increased the net output by about
175%. This policy not only increases the net output but also reduces the total
unemployment in the economy.
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28 Conclusion
This paper contributes to existing literature by studying the link between edu-
cational choices, and skill mismatch in a labour market with search frictions. As
shown in the paper, “Wage Determination with On-the-Job Search and Bargain-
ing” (Syed 2015), fewer search frictions lead to higher inequality in wages. If the
cost of education is low enough, more individuals choose to acquire education
and get trained. As a consequence mismatch increases.
The most important feature of this paper is the choice faced by a government in
terms of policy. The paper shows that a policy of giving subsidy to the firms,
which lowers their cost of vacancy is much more cost-eﬀective compared to giving
unemployment benefits that give more options to workers. Another important
feature of the paper is the eﬀect on average productivity in each education group
of an increase in the number of people in education. An increase in the number
of people in education means that the ablest among the uneducated becomes the
least able among the educated. Hence, the mean ability in each education group
decreases.
This paper shows that the cut-oﬀ ability threshold, ac, rises with the cost of
schooling, C, and a declining vacancy cost of the firms, c. This means that fewer
people invest in education with a high cost of schooling and a low cost of firm
vacancy. Total unemployment declines slightly with a declining cost of educa-
tion. However, while fewer untrained workers are unemployed, the percentage
of trained workers who are unemployed increases significantly and so does the
proportion of trained workers accepting jobs oﬀered by low technology firms. Net
output also declines.
If the government target is to reduce the mismatch of workers, the best option is
not to decrease cost of education. At the same time in order to increase the net
output in the economy the government can either give unemployment benefits
or lower the cost of firm vacancy by giving subsidies to firms. This way the
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threshold level of education is high meaning fewer people choose to get trained
and the average productivity in each education group is high. The number of
mismatched people is also lower.
In the model developed, the share of low technology and high technology firms
is fixed and determined by the free entry condition. This means that the firm
side of the market cannot fully respond to the labour market by adjusting the
types of job it oﬀers. Given the lag in the adjustment from the firm side of
the market to labour market outcomes of the workers, this phenomenon is not
uncommon. However, as a next step to add more realism, one should look into
endogenously determining the share of low and high technology firms within this
model. This would allow one to study in detail the response of the firms to the
pool of untrained and trained workers in the market.
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